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THE BELIEF OF THE JEWISH PEOPLE

AND OF THE MOST EMINENT

GENTILE PHILOSOPHERS,

MORE ESPECIALLY OF

PLATO AND ARISTOTLE,

IN

A FUTURE STATE,

BRIEFLY CONSIDERED.

THE

BELIEF OF THE JEWISH PEOPLE

AND OF THE MOST EMINENT

GENTILE PHILOSOPHERS,

MORE ESPECIALLY OF

PLATO AND ARISTOTLE,

IN

A FUTURE STATE,

BRIEFLY CONSIDERED;

INCLUDING AN EXAMINATION INTO SOME OF THE LEADING PRINCIPLES CONTAINED IN BISHOP WARBURTON'S DIVINE LEGATION OF MOSES;

IN

A DISCOURSE

PREACHED BEFORE THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD AT ST. MARY'S,

MARCH 30, 1828.

WITH NOTES AND AN APPENDIX.

BY

W. MILLS, B. D.

FELLOW OF MAGDALEN COLLEGE.

Γυμνάσιον τῆς ψυχῆς Ἡ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΙΝΗ ΣΟΦΙΑ τέλος δὲ Ἡ ΘΕΙΑ.

ORIGENES.

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TO

JOHN THOMAS HOPE, ESQ.

THE FOLLOWING

DISCOURSE

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WITH THE SINCEREST FRIENDSHIP AND REGARD.

12

PREFACE.

THE following Discourse, delivered upwards of six months since, was not originally intended for publication. It is committed to the press with the sanction of a learned friend, whose opinion the author considers of great value. It was thought that a brief statement of an important question might not be without advantage to others engaged in the same inquiries. The controversies that arose when the *Divine Legation of Warburton* was first published have long since died away, nor is it necessary to awaken them again, except as far as the chief subject of dispute is connected with the acquisition of religious truth itself. An examination into the belief of Jew or Gentile in the soul's immortality before the coming of our Saviour, can never cease to be an interesting question to the Christian philosopher. Nor

will the investigation be without profit to him who pursues it candidly, as a source of moral improvement. He may learn to be thankful on the ground of revelation for the advantages which he enjoys over the most favoured Israelite in the superior blessings and prospects of the new, compared with the old dispensation; and on the ground of his natural faculties, he will be sensible of the benefits which reason itself has derived from the word of Scripture, as well in directing as in limiting its exercise. He has seen the day clearly which the inspired patriarchs of old, with the prophetic eye of faith, at a distance, rejoiced to see; and he has received that light of imparted knowledge from Heaven, which the wisest of the heathens felt necessary to clear up the doubts of the speculative mind, and would have hailed with gratitude and reverence.

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2 TIMOTHY I. 10.

—who hath abolished death, and brought life and immortality to light through the gospel.

THESE words form part of an Epistle written by the great apostle of the Gentiles at a time when he stood in need of all the consolations to be derived from the doctrine which they convey; when he was suffering from imprisonment and persecution, and he perceived that the hour of his martyrdom was approaching. Rejoicing in the hopes which they inspired, he declared that he was afflicted, and yet was not ashamed; and looking forward to his reward, he exclaims in a subsequent part of the Epistle, *I have fought a good fight, I have finished my course, I have kept the faith: henceforth there is laid up for me a crown of righteousness, which the Lord, the righteous judge, shall give me.* Language so full of confidence in his reward and in the grounds of it, so full of trust in the righteous Judge who was to confer it, as plainly to prove that the power of death

was indeed abolished, and that life and immortality were brought to light.

Yet these expressions of my text, φωτίσαντες ζωὴν καὶ ἀφθαρσίαν, however strong they may appear, are not to be considered as implying that the expectation of a future life had never been heard of till the coming of the Messiah. In its literal acceptation the word φωτίζει signifies rather to make clear what is obscure, than to bring to light what is entirely unknown: thus φωτίζειν ἀληθείαν, to make the truth manifest, and not to shew forth a truth of which no glimmering had previously been perceived. The heathen looked forward to a future state, though he had no certain evidence for his belief, neither comprehending clearly the immortality of the soul, nor having any notion of the resurrection of the body[a]. And the Jew was instructed by revelation, that the life forfeited by the transgression of Adam was to be restored through the mediation of some future deliverer, though all the circumstances connected with the

[a] The word ἀφθαρσίαν, *incorruption*, probably conveys this meaning. Macknight and Benson.

mystery of redemption were not to be fully revealed, till our Saviour's appearance and ministry upon earth dispelled every doubt and difficulty in which the doctrine was involved, enlightening what was before obscure, and completing what was before imperfect.

It will be my object in the present discourse, to compare the knowledge both of the Gentiles and the Jewish people, respecting a future life, with the clearer revelations which Christians enjoy on this momentous subject.

That the idea of another state of existence after the termination of the present universally prevailed among mankind, the records of history unequivocally prove: there is no nation, whether savage or civilized, amongst whom some traces of it may not be found. It made a part of the popular belief in the early stages of society, before mythology was formed into a system; it was strongly impressed upon the mind before political codes gave a particular direction to it by ceremonies and modes of worship, and before philosophy exhibited

alike the power and the weakness of human reason, by the subtlety of its speculations on a subject of such overpowering interest. This conviction cannot be ascribed to the policy of the legislator, which was itself the foundation on which his religious enactments were erected, nor yet to the wisdom of the philosopher, which prevailed for ages before philosophy took its rise among mankind. It was probably a remnant of that early revelation given to our first parents, and which, amid all the changes and distractions of civil society, and all the emigrations of tribes and nations, had never been utterly obscured [b]. But in process of time, when civilization had advanced, men's ideas respecting both the nature of the Deity and the doctrine of a future state had been corrupted; gods were multiplied without number [c], the li-

[b] The notion of a future existence must be either a deduction of reason, or be derived from revelation, or an impression of instinctive consciousness.

[c] The treatise, Περὶ κόσμου, ascribed to Aristotle, speaks of the Deity as one, and derives the different names of God from the different parts of nature which he regulates. Aristot. Περὶ κόσμου, cap. 7.

centious passions of the most licentious men were ascribed to them, and the belief of a future existence was intermingled with the wildest creations of the fancy. All these notions were at length combined into order by the poet, and sanctioned by the legislator[d]; vices of the most atrocious kind were countenanced by the example of the divinities, and the authority of the laws, and the obligations of mistaken piety and public duty, lent in some cases additional stimulus to the depraved appetites of our nature[e]. Yet notwithstanding this perni-

Hesiod and Homer reduced to system the mythology of the Grecian gods. Vid. Herod. lib. ii. c. 53. Brucker, Hist. Crit. Phil. pars ii. lib. i. cap. 1. sect. 26. 31. pp. 407. 423.

In process of time, not only all the operations of external nature were explored for deities, but the most trifling acts of man himself were each under the superintendance of a particular god. Vide a singular chapter, Augustin. Civ. Dei, lib. iv. c. 11.

[d] It is because the weakness and licentiousness of Jove and the other deities, as described by Homer, furnished a bad example to mankind, that Plato wished to banish poets from his republic. Plato de Repub. lib. iii. Bekker, pars iii. vol. i. p. 107—117.

[e] The worship of Mylitta, the Babylonian goddess, is frequently cited as a preeminent instance of pagan im-

cious influence, derived from the corruptions of the doctrine, society must have been on the whole improved by it; for unless the belief had acted powerfully as a check upon the unruly desires, we cannot conceive why legislators should have taken so much pains to preserve it[f]. When philosophy, at a comparatively late period, arose, it made no claim to the invention of the notion, or to have derived it from the deductions of natural reason. Not only Plato makes continual and direct allusions

purity; yet the ordinary homage paid to the divinities in Greece and Rome at the sacred festivals, was far more pernicious in its effect upon public morals than the singular institution above alluded to. Vid. Augustin. Civ. Dei, lib. ii. cap. 4, 5. Herodot. lib. i. cap. 200.

[f] Thales, the founder of the Ionic school, flourished about six hundred years before Christ, and no regular course of reasoning was brought forward for the soul's immortality, till the time of Plato, two centuries after: Thales taught that water was the first principle, which Aristotle seems to consider as the most ancient philosophical notion, Metaph. lib. i. c. 3. and that God, or Mind, made all things out of water. As he was a native of Phœnicia, Cudworth supposes that he received his two principles from thence, "water, and the Divine Spirit "moving on the face of it." *Cudworth, Intellect. Syst.* book i. cap. i. sect. 22.

to tradition as the origin of his knowledge[g], but earlier writers were avowedly indebted to the same source; all that philosophy did pretend to was, to demonstrate that belief by arguments which was before grounded, we know not how, in the common fears and hopes of mankind. And let those who form an exalted estimate of the intellectual powers, in deciding upon such mysterious subjects, judge with what success the attempt was made, by the jarring and contradictory opinions of the different schools of antiquity. Let those who imagine that the immortality of the soul (I speak not of the resurrection of the body) is discoverable by human sagacity[h], examine the strong reasons of that unrivalled genius, who has the merit of having taught succeeding disputers to set their arguments in order on the subject. Almost all the disquisitions of Plato are grounded upon the hypothesis of the soul's preexistence[i]. Be-

[g] Vide Appendix, note A.

[h] Phædo passim.

[i] The two principal arguments in the Phædo, the one derived from the notions of the ancients respecting γένεσις,

sides confusing himself and his readers with the mazes of verbal sophistry, in which, notwithstanding all its excellencies, Greek philosophy so much abounds, he derives his fancied demonstrations from abstruse theories on the properties of generation and corruption, and the essential and eternal archetypes of things; and even the most plausible and specious are so obscured by

the other from his own philosophical belief concerning the archetypes of things, rest entirely upon such a supposition. As the term *generation* was relative, and implied its contrary *corruption*, he infers that the act of being born involves the destruction of a previous existence, from which this present coming to life is a transition. Ὁμολογεῖται ἄρα ἡμῖν καὶ ταύτῃ τοὺς ζῶντας ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων γεγονέναι. Phædo, Bekker, p. 30—34. 2dly. His theory of eternal essences, or ideas, suggests the argument that the notions which the soul has of perfect equality, perfect good, &c. which are never found in sensible objects, prove that it must have existed in a previous state, its present knowledge being nothing more than *reminiscence*. The discussion derives an incidental value, from shewing that Plato had a considerable acquaintance with the law of association. Plato, Bekker, pars ii. vol. iii. pp. 35—44.

Not one of the ancient philosophers before Christianity held the soul's immortality, without holding the preexistence of souls. They believed also the immortality and preexistence of brutes. Cudworth, Intellect. Syst. book i. cap. 1. sect. 31, 32.

the subtlety of his language[k], as to be absolutely unintelligible, except to a mind long versed in the refinements of metaphysics. Such theories as those in the Phædo could never have convinced any one of the soul's immortality, unless he had been previously prepared to believe it; nor coming, as they are supposed to have done, from the lips of Socrates in his dying hour, could they have

[k] As a specimen of unmeaning subtlety, it may be sufficient to point out that exquisite verbal trifling towards the end of the treatise, respecting the archetype of even and odd, and its application to tne question of the soul's immortality, σκόπει δὲ περὶ τῆς τριάδος, p. 99. The reader is absolutely bewildered for some time, till at length he is conducted to the conclusion—that as the essence of even does not partake of the contrary essence odd, so the soul which brings life cannot partake of the contrary essence death, and must consequently be immortal. If we had not known the treatise to be a serious inquiry upon a serious occasion, we might have been tempted to think, from the winding up of the dialogue, that the writer intended to ridicule such absurdities; Τί οὖν; τὸ μὴ δεχόμενον τὴν τοῦ ἀρτίου ἰδέαν τί νῦν δὴ ὠνομάζομεν; Ἀνάρτιον, ἔφη. Τὸ δὲ δίκαιον μὴ δεχόμενον καὶ ὃ ἂν μουσικὸν μὴ δέχηται; Ἄμουσον, ἔφη, τὸ δὲ ἄδικον. Εἶεν· ὃ δ' ἂν θάνατον μὴ δέχηται, τί καλοῦμεν; Ἀθάνατον, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν ἡ ψυχὴ οὐ δέχεται θάνατον; Οὔ. Ἀθάνατον ἄρα ἡ ψυχή. Ἀθάνατον. Εἶεν, ἔφη· τοῦτο μὲν δὴ ΑΠΟΔΕΔΕΙΧΘΑΙ φῶμεν; p. 103. Vide the whole argument, from p. 90—105.

been his only consolation. If the argument, grounded upon the compound nature of man[l], and the immateriality of the soul, be brought forward in opposition to such a view of the subject, it may be asked, was the philosopher so well acquainted, or are we ourselves, with all our additional knowledge, so well acquainted with the laws and properties of matter, as to be able to pronounce that the Being who ([m] even according to Plato's creed) made the universe out of nothing, is limited in power, and that he could not, if he would, impart thought and intelligence to a *material* substance? Or have we so clear a notion of *spirit*, or so perfect an insight into the essential qualities of *spirit*, as to be satisfied, that leaving the revealed will of the Deity out of the consideration, it is in itself incapable of annihilation?

Yet, however unsatisfactory such arguments may be, (as arguments of natural rea-

[l] The soul is divine, immortal, intelligent, uncompounded, indissoluble: the body human, mortal, without intelligence, concrete, dissoluble. Plato, Phædo, p. 50.

[m] Appendix, note B.

son on the subject ever must be[n],) shall we assent at once to the opinion of bishop Warburton, that neither Plato nor any one of the philosophers (Socrates alone excepted) who inculcated the notion of a future state themselves believed in it? By what process are we to separate his real belief from his constant and positive assertions? Those declarations of his on which so much stress has been laid, that it was lawful to deceive for the public good, were evidently intended to be

[n] Warburton's Divine Legation, book iii. sect. 2. vol. ii. edit. 1788. p. 11. 26. The observations of Warburton respecting the doctrines of the ancient philosophers, varying with the subject matter which they embraced, whether legislation or philosophy, are refined and ingenious; but they are neither universally true, nor are the conclusions he would deduce from them to be trusted. "I have observed," says he, "that those sects which joined legislation to philosophy, as the Pythagoreans, Platonists, Peripatetics, and Stoics, always professed the belief of a future state of rewards and punishments; while those who simply philosophized, as the Cyrenaic, the Cynic, &c. publicly professed the contrary." Aristotle was full as much a legislative philosopher as Plato, and far more practical; and yet there is no one passage in the whole of his works in which he directly proposes the recompense of a future state as the motive of morality; on the contrary, among the voluminous writings of Plato, there is scarcely a single treatise in which it is omitted.

understood in a limited sense only[o], and not as the basis of a philosophy, which above all others professed to have truth for its one and only object. It is not merely in his more plain and practical works that we find his recorded opinions respecting the existence of a future state; they are to be found in all his writings, whether moral, political, or physical[p]: they intermingle with the most subtle discussions in works which never could have been intended for popular instruction: and it is difficult to understand by what application of the well-known division of ancient philosophy into exoteric and esoteric[q], or by what theory of

[o] Appendix, note C.

[p] Vide Plato, edit. Bekker.
Phædo, pars ii. vol. iii. p. 106.
Apologia, pars i. vol. ii. p. 138.
Crito, pars i. vol. ii. p. 167.
Epist. 7. pars iii. vol. iii. p. 448.
Epist. 2. pars iii. vol. iii. p. 400.
Timæus, pars iii. vol. ii. p. 45.
Republic, pars iii. vol. i. pp. 502—516.
Gorgias, pars ii. vol. i. pp. 163. 164. 165.
De Legibus, pars iii. vol. iii. p. 219.
Epinomis, pars iii. vol. iii. p. 374.

[q] Appendix, note D.

a double sense, devised after Plato's own time, the same treatise, and the same portion of a treatise, could be adapted at once to instruct the philosopher and to delude the vulgar. [r] If there were certain unwritten doctrines, which were a key to his real sentiments, they have not come down to us, and we have no means of estimating their value; and it is evident that we cannot decide against the actual import of what we know, on the supposed testimony of what is altogether unknown. But it will be said, the notion of a future state [s] is

[r] Vid Brucker, vol. i. p. 660. Tennemann's Geschichte der Philosophie von Wendt. art. Plato, p. 98.

Warburton, acute as he is acknowledged to be, seems to write at times as if he confounded the three distinct ideas of esoteric treatises, unwritten doctrines, and a double sense to what is written.

[s] Warburton, book iii. sect. 3. Whately's Essays on the Peculiarities of Christianity, p. 30. Lancaster's Harmony of the Law and Gospel, p. 126. 141.

The doctrine of the absorption of the human soul is frequently imputed to Plato; but it does not appear from his own writings that he entertained the notion, nor indeed that of the Anima Mundi in the sense generally understood. He never confounds the soul of the universe with the one first Cause, Creator, and Father of all things, Plato's names for the supreme Deity are, ὁ Δημιουργὸς, ὁ

inconsistent with his philosophical theory of the reunion of the soul after death, to the one divine and universal Mind, from whence it originally emanated[t]. Now allowing, for the sake of argument, this to be Plato's opinion, which is found in the systems of other philosophers rather than in his own, is it so very easy for the understanding to realize to itself this notion of absorption into the universal spirit, in which all idea of personal consciousness is to be excluded, that we are at once to discard

Θεὸς, ὁ Ποιητὴς, καὶ Πατὴρ τοῦ ὅλοῦ, ὁ ἀεὶ Θεός. Δημιουργοῦσα Αἰτία, γενέσεως καὶ οὐσίας αἰτία, χρόνου μὴ μετέχουσα, οὐδ' ἐν χρόνῳ τὸ παράπαν οὖσα, Θεὸς αἰτιώτατος, ὁ πρῶτος θεὸς, ὁ μέγιστος θεός. The soul of the world, and other second causes, are, θεοῦ γεννήματα καὶ ἔργα, Δημιουργοῦ ὑπηρέται, θεοὶ θεῶν, who derive all their power from the first Creator.

Vid. Timæus, and his other philosophical works, passim. Plotinus, Numenius, and the Platonists of the Alexandrian school, give a very different account: with them the supreme Deity is the father of the Δημιουργὸς, the second Deity, and the Anima Mundi is the third. Eusebius, Præp. Evang. lib. xi. c. 17, 18. edit. Vigeri, Paris, 1628.

In the wild and blasphemous speculations of Cerinthus and other early heretics, the supreme Deity is also distinguished from the Δημιουργὸς, or Creator. Irenæus adv. Hæreses, lib. i. cap. 1. 13. 16. 19. 25. 33. lib. v. cap. 4.

[t] Vid. Appendix, note E.

every declaration of belief as insincere, which is at variance with the inference deducible from such a theory? Are all those expressions, in which the feelings of the man triumph over the abstractions of the philosopher, to be set aside in favour of a principle which none of those who held it either comprehended or consistently explained? The best evidences of a man's real conviction are not his speculative views, but those natural sentiments to which he gives utterance more in unison with the ordinary tendencies of the human mind. On the lofty heights of metaphysical speculation [u], clouds and darkness hover, which it

[u] The speculatist may declare, if he will, that the law of causation cannot be proved, and that the free-agency of man is disproved; yet from the very next moment to the last hour of his life, the natural course of his thoughts, words, and actions, will be in direct contradiction to his theories. If he argue that the immortality of the soul cannot be demonstrated on the principles of pure reason, the desire of the heart, the "longing after immortality," will still remain; and this (omitting revelation) is of itself the best evidence of its truth.

Αἱ γὰρ βέλτισται ψυχαὶ ΜΑΝΤΕΥΟΝΤΑΙ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν. Plato, 2 Epist. ad Dionys. Bekker, pars iii. vol. iii. p. 400.

Warburton

is not permitted to the limited powers of the most exalted intellect to disperse. [x] The difficulties multiply in proportion as we ascend, and if we imagine that we have arrived at certainty, and venture to give definite form and shape to our abstractions, we shall soon learn the mortifying lesson, how little our system will influence the practical belief of others, or even our own, when opposed to the more common motives and instinctive impressions of our nature. Those who have reflected most on such subjects will perhaps assent to the opinion, that if we would discover truth, we must pursue it in some lower region, in which the light of our moral feelings and faculties may be allowed to cheer and direct our path. These reflections, while they teach humility to ourselves, may assist us to form a

Warburton speaks with contempt of such inferences, as proper only to poetical metaphysicians and metaphysical poets; yet Aristotle, at least as sober a reasoner as himself, attributes to no argument more weight than to one grounded on our natural desires. Divine Legation, vol. iii. p. 632. Aristot. Ethic. book i. chap. 2. Rhet. book ii. chap. 19.

[x] Appendix, note F.

right estimate as to the actual belief of the ancient philosophers on the subject of a future existence. [y] It is not because they give way to doubts and misgivings; (on such a subject how could it be otherwise?) it is not because we meet with unintelligible theories; this has been the history of metaphysics in all ages and under all religions: it is not because these theories might lead to consequences inconsistent with their positive declarations, that we are to come at once to the conclusion that they had no belief in what they asserted, and that Socrates and Plato[z] (for we have no certain

[y] If the misgivings of Socrates at one time are brought forward, let us remember the strength and confidence of his assertions at others. Vid. Phædo, p. 120.

Sequitur ex his nobile Socraticæ scholæ dogma; animum esse immortalem et habere post mortem præmia virtutis: quod morte sua obsignavit et confirmavit Socrates. Videtur non tam de animorum post hanc vitam felicitate dubitasse quam de ejus conditione et loco, quo referenda sunt, si vere sunt Socratis quæ apud Antonium et Maximum ei tribuuntur, interrogatum quænam in altero mundo sint obvia, respondisse, se neque ipsum ibi unquam fuisse neque cum ullo eorum qui inde rediissent colloquutum esse. Hist. Crit. Phil. Brucker, vol. i. pp. 563, 564.

[z] Warburton and others attempt to separate the opin-

criterion by which we can separate the opinions of the one from those of the other,) made it the sole business of their lives to deceive those whom they pretended to teach. The general tone and temper pervading their discussions is at variance with such an opinion. [a]It is a striking feature in the character of Socrates, and which well entitles him to the admiration even of Christians, that, surrounded with mysteries which he could not explain, and in the midst of darkness which he could not pene-

ions of Socrates from those of Plato. Whether the fact be so or not, we have no means of distinguishing between them. As far as Plato's own evidence is available, the contrary is the case. *Διὰ ταῦτα οὐδὲν πώποτ' ἐγὼ περὶ τούτων γέγραφα, οὐδ' ἔστι σύγγραμμα* ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ *οὐδὲν οὐδ' ἔσται, τὰ δὲ νῦν λεγόμενα* ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ *ἐστί.* Plat. 2 Epist. ad Dionys. p. 406.

I do not wish to insist on the positive testimony of this passage, on account of the obvious advantage it must have been to the philosopher to convey his instructions freely to his friend, through the medium of another's name; I am speaking of course of their opinions on moral subjects. It is well known that Plato discussed physical questions, which Socrates did not: *Σωκράτους δὲ περὶ μὲν τὰ ἠθικὰ πραγματευομένου περὶ δὲ τῆς ὅλης φύσεως οὐδέν.* Aristot. Metaphys. lib. i. cap. 6.

[a] Appendix, note G.

trate, he seems to have reposed implicit confidence in the benevolence of the Deity even unto death[b], and to have believed in

[b] Socrates is full of expressions indicating that implicit confidence in the justice and benevolence of the Deity, which is the root and foundation of all religious faith.

In the Theætetus, Θεὸς οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς ἄδικος, ἀλλ' ὡς οἷόν τε δικαιότατος, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτῷ ὁμοιότερον οὐδὲν ἢ ὃς ἂν ἡμῶν αὖ γένηται ὅτι δικαιότατος. Bekker, pars ii. vol. i. p. 247. In the Gorgias, Μὴ γὰρ τοῦτο μὲν, τὸ ζῆν ὁποσονδὴ χρόνον, τόν γε ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄνδρα εὐκτέον ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ φιλοψυχητέον, ἀλλ' ἐπιτρεψάντα περὶ τούτων τῷ Θεῷ. Bekker, pars ii. vol. i. p. 142. Again, in the same treatise, speaking of the unjust and intemperate man, Οὔτε γὰρ ἂν ἄλλῳ ἀνθρώπῳ προσφιλὴς ἂν εἴη ὁ τοιοῦτος οὔτε Θεῷ. Bekker, pars ii. vol. i. p. 133. In the Theages, a treatise ascribed to Plato, Ἐὰν μὲν τῷ Θεῷ φίλον ᾖ, πάνυ πολὺ ἐπιδώσεις καὶ ταχὺ, εἰ δὲ μὴ, οὔ. Bekker, pars ii. vol. iii. p. 280. In the Apologia, Οὐδὲ ἀμελεῖται ὑπὸ Θεῶν τὰ τούτου πράγματα. Bekker, pars i. vol. ii. p. 139. Vide also Alcibiades I. if this dialogue was really written by Plato, which admits of some doubt.

SOC. Οὐ καλῶς λέγεις, Ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη.

ALC. Ἀλλὰ πῶς χρὴ λέγειν;

SOC. Ὅτι ἐὰν Θεὸς ἐθέλῃ, p. 373.

SOC. Ὁ ἐπίτροπος ὁ ἐμὸς βελτίων ἐστὶ καὶ σοφώτερος ἢ Περικλῆς ὁ σός.

ALC. Τίς οὗτος, ὦ Σώκρατες;

SOC. Θεὸς, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, κ. τ. λ. Bekker, pars ii. vol. iii. p. 345.

It may be worth mentioning also, that Socrates considered suicide a criminal act of disobedience to the Deity: because we are here at our post assigned us by the gods,

him *as a rewarder of them that diligently seek him*, in spite of all the doubts that confounded his understanding, and the wrongs and oppressions which he endured. Whatever were his views on the abstract question of the universal soul, he is uniform in teaching that no happiness in this life was perfect, and that our happiness in another would depend upon our conduct during our present existence. He reasoned as Hooker reasoned, that no sensible, no moral and civil perfection, was sufficient to satisfy the desires which nature had implanted [c]. [d] He exhorted men to aspire (to

and may not leave without their permission. Τόδε γέ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Κέβης, εὖ λέγεσθαι, τὸ Θεοὺς εἶναι ἡμῶν τοὺς ἐπιμελομένους. Phædo, p. 13.

[c] In the Convivium of Plato, Socrates is represented as making celestial love the source of every duty towards gods and men; and admonishing his hearers, that all the labours and desires of the soul ought to aim at that supreme archetype of beauty and truth, which is perfect in itself, uniform and unchangeable, and in the possession of which alone complete happiness can be found. Convivium, pars ii. vol. ii. Plato, Bekker, p. 444, &c.

Sentences like these remind us of bishop Butler's sermon on the Love of God; and some of the most beautiful passages in the earlier parts of Hooker's Ecclesiastical

use the words of Hooker) to "something "spiritual and divine; that which exceed- "eth the reach of sense, yea somewhat "above the capacity of reason, which with "hidden exaltation it rather surmiseth than "conceiveth[e]." This divine felicity in a future state was to consist in the contemplation of truth in its substantial beauty and perfection, of which we only see the shadow here below, through the dark medium of the senses and imagination[f]. Hence

Polity, vid. p. 260. vol. i. 8vo. edit. Leighton's 4th and 5th Lectures are also written very much in the spirit of Plato's exhortations; Leighton's Works, vol. iv.

[d] Appendix, notes H and I.

[e] Cedant igitur hi omnes (says Augustin, speaking of other sects) illis philosophis qui non dixerunt beatum esse hominem, fruentem corpore, vel fruentem animo, sed fruentem Deo. *August. Civ. Dei*, lib. viii. c. 8.

It is very true, that some of St. Augustin's observations respecting the similarity of Plato's sentiments to the precepts of Christianity, are applicable only to the refinements introduced by the later Platonists: yet Plato himself certainly inculcated the notion to which the words above cited allude.

[f] Vide that beautiful passage in the Phædo, unequalled perhaps for the flowing harmony of its language in the whole compass of Greek literature; in which he describes the effect of the passions in darkening the under-

his continual exhortations to die daily, (they are almost the words of Plato[g];) to subdue, even to their utter extinction, those corrupt affections which alike darken the understanding, and are the cause of all moral evil. He asserts, in the language of holy writ, that the wars and fightings which exist among mankind, proceed from the unruly passions *that war in their members*[h], and that it was only by overcoming these, and practising virtue, which was an imitation of the Deity, that we could hope to enjoy the happiness of the Deity hereafter[i].

standing, and the power of philosophy in emancipating the soul from their tyranny. Plato, Bekker, pars ii. vol. iii. pp. 55—58.

g True philosophers, οὐδὲν ἄλλο αὐτοὶ ἐπιτηδεύουσιν ἢ ἀποθνήσκειν τε καὶ τεθνάναι. Phædo, Bekker, p. 16.

h Καὶ γὰρ πολέμους καὶ στάσεις καὶ μάχας οὐδὲν ἄλλο παρέχει ἢ τὸ σῶμα καὶ αἱ τούτου ἐπιθυμίαι. Phædo, page 21. compare St. James iv. 1.

i Διὸ καὶ πειρᾶσθαι χρὴ ἐνθένδε ἐκεῖσε φεύγειν ὅτι ταχίστα. φυγὴ δὲ ΌΜΟΙΩΣΙΣ ΘΕΩΙ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν. ΌΜΟΙΩΣΙΣ δὲ δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον μετὰ φρόνησεως γενέσθαι. Theætetus, Bekker, pars ii. vol. i. p. 247. It was the saying of the Pythagorean philosophers, from whom Plato probably borrowed the sentiment: τέλος ἀνθρώπου ὁμοίωσις θεῷ. Eusebius asserts that this idea, of its being the perfection of man to imitate the Deity, was taken from the Hebrew scriptures.

In the spirit of the precept, which teaches that obedience is better than sacrifice, he declares that God is not propitiated by offerings and victims, but by the virtues of the soul, by piety, justice, and truth[k]. He cautions his hearers against pride and high-mindedness, by admonishing them that the man who adhered to what was just, with a *humble* and well-regulated temper, would enjoy happiness and the favour of the Deity, while he who indulged an insolent spirit, swelling with pride and ambition, would be left deserted by God. In listening to such sentiments, who does not recollect the language of inspiration, which declares that *God resisteth the proud, and giveth grace to the humble*[l]? He teaches, that not only evil

Μωσεῖ δὲ καὶ ἐν τούτοις ὥσπερ μεμαθητευμένος ὁ Πλάτων τοιαδ' ἐν τῷ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ φησίν. κ. τ. λ. Eusebius, Præp. Evangel. lib. xi. cap. 27. Vigeri edit. Paris. 1628. Plato, Alcibiad. Bekker, pars ii. vol. iii. p. 368.

[k] Καὶ γὰρ ἂν δεινὸν εἴη, εἰ πρὸς τὰ δῶρα καὶ τὰς θυσίας ἀποβλέπουσιν ἡμῶν οἱ θεοὶ, ἀλλὰ μὴ πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν, ἄν τις ὅσιος καὶ δίκαιος ὢν τυγχάνῃ. Alcibiades II. Bekker, pars i. vol. ii. p. 295.

[l] Vid. Plato de Legibus, lib. iv. Bekker, pars iii. vol. ii. p. 355. Eusebius, Præp. Evangel. lib. xi. cap. 13. St. James, iv. 6.

actions are to be avoided, but that light and idle words are to be shunned: for an avenging Nemesis was appointed to take account of, and severely to punish, even these[m]. That this vengeance of the gods, the wicked man could by no efforts either elude or escape; if he could take wings and fly up to heaven, or could penetrate into the very depths of the earth, it would still pursue and search him out, either here or hereafter[n]. Such maxims are certainly admirable, and inferior only to that perfect wisdom which came from the lips of Him who *spake as never man spake*[o], and who proposed to the imitation of his followers no imaginary pattern, removed alike from their sight and their comprehension, but descended upon

[m] Διότι ΚΟΥΦΩΝ καὶ ΠΤΗΝΩΝ ΛΟΓΩΝ βαρυτάτη ζημία· πᾶσι γὰρ ἐπίσκοπος τοῖς περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐτάχθη Δίκης Νέμεσις ἄγγελος. De Legibus, lib. iv. p. 357.

[n] Οὐχ οὕτω σμικρὸς ὢν δύσει κατὰ τὸ τῆς γῆς βάθος, οὐδ' ὑψηλὸς γενόμενος εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν ἀναπτήσει, τίσεις δὲ αὐτῶν, τὴν προσήκουσαν τιμωρίαν εἴτ' ἐνθάδε μένων εἴτε καὶ ἐν Ἅιδου διαπορευθείς. De Legibus, lib. x. p. 219.

[o] Mirantur quidam nobis in gratia Christi sociati cum audiunt vel legunt Platonem de Deo ista sensisse quæ multum congruere veritati religionis nostræ agnoscunt. *Augustin. Civ. Dei*, lib. viii. c. 11.

earth, and went about doing good, the visible and embodied model and archetype of truth. Whether these precepts are called morality or philosophical purification, which necessarily included within it the idea of morality, their natural tendency, unless counteracted by other causes, must have been beneficial [p]; for those only who trained themselves by them were to be admitted to the future happiness; those who did not, were to be excluded from it; whether the participation or exclusion were derived from some law of physical necessity inherent in the soul, or depended on the decision of a supreme Judge [q]. For allusions to a future judgment, including as it does the idea of retribution in its more strict and proper sense, are by no means wanting. In the same treatise, in which we find him declaring before the tribunal of his country, that there was a divine voice within him which

[p] Apologia Socratis, Plato, Bekker, pars i. vol. ii. p. 118. Hist. Crit. Phil. Brucker, vol. i. p. 564.

[q] Phædo, Bekker, pars ii. vol. iii. p. 107. Epist. 7. Bekker, pars iii. vol. iii. p. 448. Gorgias, Bekker, pars ii. vol. i. p. 167.

commanded him *to obey God rather than man*[r], he is represented as deriving consolation from the reflection that there would be a more just judgment hereafter. And after his condemnation, when his friends had made all things ready for his escape from prison, and urged him to fly from his impending fate, he refuses at once, alleging as the grounds of his refusal the duty of submission to the laws: when they persist in their solicitations, urging that the injustice of the law, in condemning him though innocent, would warrant his disobedience; he answers them with the Christian maxim, that it is our duty to *return good for evil*[s];

[r] ΠΕΙΣΟΜΑΙ ΔΕ ΜΑΛΛΟΝ ΤΩΙ ΘΕΩΙ Η ΥΜΙΝ. Apologia, Bekker, pars i. vol. ii. p. 115. εὑρήσει τοὺς ὡς ΑΛΗΘΩΣ ΔΙΚΑΣΤΑΣ, οἵ περ καὶ λέγονται ἐκεῖ δικάζειν. Apologia, p. 138. The practical effects of his belief in a future judgment are stated also in the Gorgias: Ὑπὸ τούτων τῶν λόγων πέπεισμαι, καὶ σκοπῶ ὅπως ἀποφανοῦμαι τῷ κριτῇ ὡς ὑγιεστάτην τὴν ψυχήν. χαίρειν οὖν ἐάσας τὰς τιμὰς τὰς τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, τὴν ἀλήθειαν σκοπῶν, πειράσομαι τῷ ὄντι ὡς ἂν δύνωμαι βέλτιστος ὢν καὶ ζῇν καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθνήσκω ἀποθνήσκειν. Παρακαλῶ δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πάντας ἀνθρώπους. Gorgias, Plato, Bekker, pars ii. vol. i. p. 170.

[s] The passage is very strong in the original: Socrates denies that we have the right, under any circumstances,

assigning at the same time as the motive of his conduct, that he may be able to give a good account to the gods who reign in Hades[t]. Thus the very same man whose arguments for the soul's immortality are unsatisfactory or unintelligible, teaches in plain and simple language the right source of moral obligation[u], the most perfect moral precept, and the strongest motive and encouragement for the practice of it

of returning evil for evil: Οὔτε ἄρα ΑΝΤΑΔΙΚΕΙΝ δεῖ οὔτε ΚΑΚΩΣ ΠΟΙΕΙΝ οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων, ΟΥΔ' ΑΝ ΟΤΙΟΥΝ ΠΑΣΧΗΙ ΥΠ' ΑΥΤΩΝ. Crito, Bekker, pars i. vol. ii. p. 157.

In the Gorgias also he declares that it is better to suffer injustice than to commit it: Σὺ ἄρα βούλοιο ἂν ἀδικεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ἀδικεῖν; (Soc.) Βούλοιμην μὲν ἂν ἔγωγε οὐδέτερα· εἰ δ' ἀναγκαῖον εἴη ἀδικεῖν ἢ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἑλοίμην ἂν μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ἀδικεῖν. Gorgias, Bekker, pars ii. vol. i. p. 49.

[t] Μήτε παῖδας περὶ πλείονος ποιοῦ μήτε τὸ ζῆν μήτε ἄλλο μηδὲν πρὸ τοῦ δικαίου, ἵνα εἰς Ἅιδου ἐλθὼν ἔχῃς ταῦτα πάντα ἀπολογήσασθαι τοῖς ἐκεῖ ἄρχουσιν. Crit. p. 167.

[u] The statement here given by no means coincides with the following assertions of Warburton: "The ancients "neither knew the *origin of obligation* nor the *consc-* "*quence of obedience*. Revelation hath discovered these "principles; and we now wonder that such prodigies of "parts and knowledge could commit the gross absurdities "which are to be found in their best discourses on mo- "rality." *Divine Legation*, lib. iii. s. 5. vol. iii. p. 144.

in the expectation of future retribution. It is not my intention to pursue the subject at length through the different schools of antiquity; through the scepticism of some, the atheism of others, or the systems of those who allowed the existence, yet denied the providence of God; nor to examine how far their principles are consistent with their ordinary precepts, and the comparative credit due to either in deciding upon their own belief. But it may be a matter of interesting inquiry to investigate the opinions of one distinguished teacher respecting a future state, who more than divided with Plato the empire of philosophy. It is however by no means easy to ascertain the sentiments of Aristotle on the subject: as he taught that happiness would be the reward of virtue in this life, he makes few allusions in his practical works to the destinies of the soul in another state of being. He never directly proposes the doctrine of a future retribution as the motive of our morality: and though he certainly held the soul's immortality, it is doubted by some if he believed its exist-

ence after death in a state of personal identity. In that important question, whether the abstract principles of reason or the common opinions of mankind are the best evidence of truth, he uniformly gives the preference to the latter[x]. And if this be adopted as the test of his own notions in the present case, he believed in the separate existence of the soul, for he represents it as affected after death by the fortunes of its living friends[y]: but at other times his language appears to be of a different tendency; and in his metaphysical works, if amid many perplexed and obscure statements his meaning be rightly understood[z],

[x] Hence his continual appeal in his Ethics to the *language* of men as an evidence of truth: and in the 10th book, chap. 8, he observes, that the arguments of philosophers have weight when they agree with experience, but when they disagree they must be rejected.

[y] Aristot. Ethics, lib. i. cap. 11.

[z] Vid. Aristot. de Anima, book ii; also more particularly book iii. chap. 5, 6. Tennemann's Geschichte der Philosophie, art. *Aristotle*, p. 109. Cudworth's Intellect. Syst. book i. §. 45. Warburton's Divine Legation, book 3. sect. 4. vol. iv. p. 112. No writer but Warburton professes to think Aristot. de Anima, book iii. chap. 5, 6. clear and intelligible. His theory of the TO 'EN intro-

he denies to that part, or rather power of the soul which he invests with immortality, the possession of memory, and consequently, by a possible though not necessary inference, of individual consciousness[a]. The failure of the two most distinguished among the philosophers of antiquity may teach us how little the force of natural reason could effect in clearing up the most important of all subjects. Whatever they believed themselves, or their followers believed, respecting a future state, could not have been altogether in consequence of their arguments. As moralists they speak with the tongue of men and of angels, and prescribe a code of moral discipline beyond the capacity of man to practise, but their reasonings for the soul's immortality, with some few exceptions, began and ended in speculations alike inconceivable and unprofitable, and left the common expectations of mankind, loaded as they were with absurdity, a better guide even to themselves

duced to explain the difficulty is an assumption, not an argument.

[a] Appendix, note K.

than all the abstractions of philosophy How often must Plato have felt, when baffled and perplexed by the subtlety of his own reasonings, the wish which he once so strongly expressed[b], that the Deity would

[b] The words ἀναγκαῖον οὖν ἐστὶ περιμένειν ἕως ἄν τις μάθῃ ὡς δεῖ πρὸς θεοὺς καὶ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους διακεῖσθαι. Alcib. Πότε οὖν παρέσται ὁ χρόνος οὗτος, ὦ Σώκρατες; καὶ τίς ὁ παιδεύσων; ἥδιστα γὰρ ἄν μοι δοκῶ ἰδεῖν τοῦτον τὸν ἄνθρωπον τίς ἐστιν, have been frequently cited by theologians as a proof that Socrates expected some divine Teacher to appear upon earth; and it was with this impression that the remarks were make in the text. If however the passage be fully examined in connection with the dialogue that follows to the end of the treatise, it will appear very dubious whether they have any such meaning. The more probable import seems to be, that Socrates is speaking of himself, as the teacher who watched over the interests of Alcibiades, but he was aware that his disciple would not receive his instructions till his mind at some future period should be less clouded by passion, and become better prepared to distinguish between good and evil. Alcibiades II. Bekker, pars i. vol. ii. pp. 296—298. Nor will the passage in the Republic, (οὕτω διακείμενος ὁ δίκαιος .... ἀνασχινδυλευθήσεται, Bekker, p. 66.) which is referred to by Blackwall and many other learned men, as a prophetic description of our Saviour's crucifixion, appear to admit any application of the kind, if the whole discussion concerning justice and injustice be calmly considered from the commencement of the book to the words alluded to. Repub. lib. ii. Bekker, pp. 57—66.

appoint some one to reveal his will to man, and enlighten his mind upon subjects too excellent for human intellect to attain to!

Let us turn from the speculations of pagan philosophy, to consider the belief of the Jewish people respecting a future state of retribution, possessing as they did the benefits of a divine revelation.

[c] The opinion has been maintained and supported with great learning and ability, that throughout the Old Testament, from Moses to the captivity, the Israelites had not the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments; and that so much as an intelligible hint of it is not found in the Mosaic law.

That being omitted in the sanctions of the law, it was clearly never intended to be revealed to them.

That in quality of *historian* as well as of legislator Moses is silent on the subject, and seems designedly to conceal the future immortality.

[c] Warburton's Divine Legation of Moses, book v. sect. 5. vol. iii. pp. 131—134. edit. 1788.

[d]That the extraordinary providence, which under the Jewish dispensation extended both to the state and the particular members of the state, would prevent any of that feeling arising from the unequal distribution of things, which, under the ordinary course of God's providence, so naturally directs the hopes of men to the recompense of another life.

These propositions are certainly at variance with the general sentiments on the subject; and it may not be unprofitable briefly to examine as well into their truth or falsehood, as also into the nature of that foundation on which they are supposed to rest.

[e]Now it will readily be allowed by every

[d] Book v. sect. 4. vol. iii. pp. 112—131.

[e] Davison on Prophecy, p. 166. Maimonides and the most eminent Jewish doctors maintain that eternal life is to be found in the law, and that it is to be believed, not from other considerations, but because it is in the law. For the mode in which they support their interpretations vide Pearson on the Creed, edit. Oxford, 1797. 2d vol. p. 464. Warburton, Dedicat. to the Jews, 2d vol. p. 282.

Warburton, book vi. sect. 3. vol. iii. p. 343. has cited the texts adduced by Manasseh Ben-Israel from the Pentateuch, in his tract de Resurrectione Mortuorum. For

candid inquirer, that, using the term *Mosaic law* in its strict and limited sense, as the code delivered on mount Sinai, the doctrine of future retribution is not to be found in it. For the cabalistic interpretations and distortions of words and phrases, by which many of the Jewish rabbin attempt to establish a different opinion, are too absurd to require refutation; and those solemn expressions of Moses, *I call heaven and earth to record this day against you, that I have set before you life and death, blessing and cursing, therefore choose life,* which some theologians understand of a future and eternal life, appear, when taken in connection with their context, to refer, in their simple and primary sense at least,

the immortality, Exod. xix. 6. xxxiii. 20. Levit. vii. 25. Deut. xiv. 1, 2. xxii. 7. xxxii. 47. For the resurrection, Gen. iii. 19. xxxvii. 10. Exod. xv. 6. Levit. xxv. Numb. xv. 30. xviii. 28. Deut. iv. 4. xxxii. 39. xxxiii. 6. He has also given at length Rabbi Tanchum's ridiculous Comment on 1 Sam. xxv. 29. Vide also Michaelis Argumenta Immortalitatis, sect. 9. p. 96. Syntagma Comment. Goettingæ 1759. who enumerates several texts from the Diatribe of Theodorus Dassovius, some of which are the same with those mentioned above, others different.

to the benefits of this life only[f]. And most certainly this promise of temporal good and evil on the part of the legislator, as the recompense of obedience or disobedience, when combined with the historical fact, that the fortunes of the Jewish people for ages are in exact accordance with it[g], an agreement which no human wisdom could have foreseen, and no human power could have fulfilled, does prove that the legislator himself was an ambassador from heaven, and that he must have been appointed by that omniscient and omnipotent Being, who alone could make the contingent designs and contingent operations of free agents, whether acting individually or as nations, contribute to the accomplishment of his own certain and unchangeable pur-

[f] Deut. xxx. 19. Mr. Peters contends that the Abrahamic covenant was renewed in this chapter, and bishop Bull understood it in the same way. Vid. Critical Dissertation on Book of Job, by Mr. Peters, part iii. sect. 3. also bishop Bull's Harmon. Apostol. Dissert. Poster. cap. 11. This able divine argues very strongly throughout the chapter in favour of the hypothesis alluded to.

[g] Vid. Joshua xxiii. 14. *All are come to pass unto you, and not one thing hath failed thereof.*

poses. But to argue that, in consequence of this omission, it was intended by Moses, or rather by the Almighty, whose servant he was, that the Jews should be shut out from the knowledge of a future state, would[h] imply a far greater acquaintance with the counsels of divine wisdom than we may presume to lay claim to. The question, whether the Jews believed on such a doctrine or not, would depend upon the means they might have of acquiring information from other sources besides their legal code; and whether the necessary effect of the Mosaic code would be to check or annihilate every other source of instruction. In order to understand the subject rightly it is necessary to keep in mind the object of that law, which was[i], to preserve the

[h] The law in its sanctions is only *positive*, that God will do so much, not *exclusive*, that he will do nothing more. Davison on Prophecy, p. 175.

Warburton's work was translated into German in 1751. J. D. Michaelis published a short Dissertation (if not written, corrected by him) against it, Argumenta Immortalitatis Animorum humanorum ex Mose collecta. Goettingæ 1752. Vide Schröckh. viii. Theil. vol. xliii. p. 753.

[i] Warburton, book v. sect. 2. vol. iii. p. 66.

memory of the one God in an idolatrous world, till the coming of Christ. And it is difficult to conceive how this object could be effected by any other than temporal rewards; by any other than some signal and visible manifestations of the divine power, which might convince the heathen nations that the God of the Hebrews was indeed a God that doeth wonders, and might recall to the carnal-minded Jew himself, when tempted to forget his Benefactor, by the immediate vengeance attendant upon transgression, a sense at once of his obligations and his privileges:[k] *I will send my fear before thee, and will destroy all the people to whom thou shalt come, and I will make all thine enemies turn their backs unto thee.*

[l] *And five of you shall chase an hundred, and an hundred of you shall put ten thousand to flight, and your enemies shall fall before you by the sword.*

Such was the promised recompense of obedience; but in case of disobedience the threat is denounced:

[k] Exod. xxiii. 27. [l] Levit. xxvi. 8.

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[m] *I will set my face against you, and ye shall be slain before your enemies.*

[n] *And I will scatter you among the heathen, and will draw out a sword after you, and your land shall be desolate and your cities waste.*

Nor does it appear that this promise of temporal good, as many of the opponents of Warburton[o] contended, was confined to the nation only: health and wealth, fertility to the field and fruitfulness to the cattle, the blessing of the olive and the vine, the basket and the store, every kind of prosperity, was promised to the individual also; yet as well to the individual as to the state, in reference to the main object, the preservation of both from idolatry, which would generally be best effected by the more striking example of national blessings and national punishments. Yet it is difficult to understand how such a condition of things should destroy in the minds of the people either those natural expecta-

[m] Levit. xxvi. 17. [n] Levit. xxvi. 33.

[o] Mr. Peters and other opponents of Warburton.

tions which the rest of mankind cherished in regard to a future state, or the authority of revelation, supposing the doctrine were contained in other inspired writings, which they acknowledged, besides the ordinances of their legal code. The extraordinary providence under which they lived could not justify the ways of God to man upon the ground of reason, as *a rewarder of them that diligently seek him*, for (it has been well remarked) though an *extraordinary* providence[p], it was not an *equal* providence, and under such a dispensation as the Mosaic (with reverence be it spoken) Omnipotence itself could not make it so. If the land suffered for its transgressions and became captive to its enemies, it is hardly possible to imagine that some innocent individuals should not have suffered with it. We read in the books of Moses, that when one particular person had committed the offence,

p Mr. Peters (p. 263.) observes, that an extraordinary providence does by no means include or infer an equal providence. Mr. Lancaster has very properly remarked on the egregious fallacy of Warburton in confounding the two ideas. Vide Mr. Lancaster's Harmony of the Law and the Gospel, p. 157.

the whole army and nation was punished for his sin, though ignorant of it. In like manner, subjects were punished for the disobedience of the king. Again, when the father offended, his innocent children and family were cut off with him; and, supposing they escaped the legal penalty, the loss of the father would itself be an infliction of evil on his kindred. The author of the Divine Legation has called circumstances like these, inequalities of events, and necessarily arising from an equal providence[q], as if by a change of phrase he could get rid of the fact, that under such a dispensation the innocent suffered with the guilty; and that it was even a necessary and appointed part of it for the crimes of the fathers to be visited upon the children. Yet, amid such inequalities, have we any reason to

[q] Warburton's Divine Legation, book v. sect. 4. vol. iii. p. 121.

He attempts also most paradoxically to shew that the sacred writers, when they speak (more particularly in the Book of Psalms and Ecclesiastes) of the inequalities of Providence and the unfit distribution of things, allude to a dispensation existing among their pagan neighbours, and not in Judæa. Book v. sect. 4. vol. iii. p. 120.

suppose that the peculiar people of God, favoured as they were acknowledged to be, should have been deprived of those hopes of future recompense, in which every other nation under heaven, when oppressed with calamity, could find consolation? And strong as the sanctions of their temporal code might be as a motive of moral conduct, have we any probable grounds for supposing that the Almighty excluded from the breast of the Jew the fear of future retribution, which, in many secret offences to which the law cannot reach, provides a surer check than temporal evils or temporal death, and which, even under such a religion as paganism, had a powerful operation in deterring men from transgression: for we have the testimony of one of their own writers that it was the inordinate lusts and passions of men that made them atheists[r]? Nor is it necessary for us to explain why, if it were intended that the Jewish people should look forward to the good or evil of the future life, it was not made a part of

[r] Ἀκρατεία ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν. Plato de Legibus, lib. x. Bentley's First Sermon on the Folly of Atheism.

the sanctions of their law. We cannot reason clearly on the purposes of the Almighty, who knows better than we do the comprehensiveness of his own designs, and the best method and the best time of accomplishing them: *The secret things belong unto the Lord, but those things which are revealed belong unto us and to our children for ever*[s]. Yet if we reflect upon the method which God had appointed, by which man was to be made partaker of eternal life, the propitiation of Christ and not his own merit or obedience, we may be led to understand why the promise of eternal life was not given in the law[t]. Those who lived under such a system might in that case have supposed that the gift of eternal life was annexed as the deserved reward of obe-

[s] Deut. xxix. 29.

[t] The apostle's answer will serve me; *For if there had been a law which could have given life, verily righteousness should have been by the law*, Gal. iii. 21. that is, if the genius of *the law* had produced such a dispensation as was proper to convey to mankind the free gift of life and immortality, this gift would have been conveyed by it. Warburton, vol. iii. book v. sect. 6. p. 163; vid. also p. 162. Mr. Lancaster's Harmony, preface, and p. 11. and 12.

dience to the law; that the law was in itself perfect, and sufficient for man's justification, and not the *shadow of good things to come*, and the preparation of a system founded upon *better promises*. It is evident from the Epistles of St. Paul, that it was their confidence in the allsufficiency of legal ordinances which wrought so strongly on the ancient Jews in their obstinate rejection of the gospel; they believed that their scriptures held out the blessing of immortality as the destined portion of Israel; and they were persuaded, that, if not directly taught in the law, it was implied in it, and would be given to the faithful Israelite through the instrumentality of its sanctions alone. Supposing then eternal life had been the explicit promise of the Mosaic code, all these errors would have acquired tenfold strength; their bitter aversion to the gospel would in some degree have been built upon reason, rather than upon blind prejudice; and some of the most powerful arguments, urged by the apostle to overcome the obstinacy of his countrymen, would have lost much of their force

and propriety. And this reliance of their forefathers on the privileges of their law has been more than continued and confirmed in the breasts of the modern Jews. The perverted [u] ingenuity of rabbinical interpreters since the dispersion of Israel, superadded to the ancient traditions, has inspired them with the full conviction that eternal life is *expressly* revealed in the law; and to this, among other causes, may be ascribed the tenacious adherence with which the scattered remnant of the Jewish people still cling to the ancient dispensation [x]. If these reflections be well-founded, the notion of a double covenant and a twofold law proposed by Moses, as of positive enactment, the one his own national covenant with temporal promises, the other the Abrahamic covenant with eternal life, a theory which some eminent divines have adopted with a view of reconciling difficulties, would be in itself an improbable hypothesis; nor

[u] More especially of Maimonides, who lived in the 12th century.

[x] Vid. Mr. Lancaster's Supplementary Remarks, p. 373.

are the words upon which this idea is grounded sufficient to support the superstructure raised upon them.

From this general view of the question, it is time to appeal to the word of God, and to examine how far the promises and prophecies relative to the future redemption contained in the inspired writings, previous to the captivity, together with those sentiments and turns of expression which meet our eyes almost in every page, are consistent with the opinion that the peculiar people of God were shut out from the knowledge of a future state. In making this examination, we should be cautious of attributing too much weight to the inferences we are now enabled to draw, by means of the full revelation we enjoy, from passages whether in the law of Moses or in other parts of the Old Testament[y]. The words that convey to our minds clear notions of a future state might not have appeared in the same light to the understanding of the ancient Jews.

[y] Vide some very just remarks in Dr. Whately's Essays on the peculiarities of Christianity, p. 49. on the passage cited by our Lord himself against the Sadducees.

But not to insist upon inferences more or less doubtful from particular texts, it would seem extraordinary, if, intrusted as they were with the oracles of God, in which the scheme of mercy and deliverance from the death denounced upon Adam and his posterity is the one great object, proceeding gradually to its accomplishment, from the fall to the birth of our Saviour, they could passively and without reflection have yielded themselves to the punishment of Adam, the bitter sting of death, without meditating upon the promises and blessings scattered through the same early records which related the original transgression. In a narrative so concise as the history of the fall is, we cannot determine with what degree of clearness the revelation of redemption, and of future triumph over the tempter, was conveyed to the minds of our first parents in the curse pronounced upon the serpent, that his head should be bruised by the seed of the woman: but it is impossible (as Warburton himself allows) that the words could have been understood in the bare literal sense; and without attempting to give any

undue extent to their signification, through the reflected light thrown upon them subsequently by the progressive developement of the Almighty's purposes, it is surely most probable, (because most consistent with that union of justice and mercy which pervade all the divine dispensations,) that at a time when the Father of mankind was bowed down under the weight of a penalty which condemned him to eat bread with the sweat of his brow, till he returned to the dust from whence he came, they were intended to convey to him the only hope of which he could be susceptible, the anticipation of final deliverance from his misery. What reflections would naturally suggest themselves to the ancient Israelite, when, bearing this promise in mind, he was taught, as he proceeded in the sacred volume, that God looked with an eye of regard on the sacrifice of Abel, and rejected the offering of Cain, and yet suffered the same righteous Abel to be murdered through envy excited by his righteousness! He might read that the patriarchs of his race were the friends and favourites of God, and yet were strang-

ers and pilgrims upon earth; and while they rejoiced that their pilgrimage was drawing to a close, and they were about to be *gathered to their fathers*, would he believe that this joy was excited by the termination of their earthly labours in the insensibility of the grave; and that being [z] *gathered to their fathers* meant no more than that the same sepulchre which had covered the bones of their fathers should soon be the receptacle of their own? We learn that Abraham looked for a city which hath foundations, and that he was commanded to train up his children and household in the way of the Lord [a]; and would the memory of these instructions be eradicated entirely from the breasts of the children of Abraham? [b] Can we imagine that the

[z] Warburton allows that the *origin* of this phrase must have been derived from the notion of a common receptacle for souls, vol. iii. book vi. sect. 3. p. 320. Michaelis observes, that the Hebrew word signifies non *congregari*, solum sed et *hospitio excipi*. Argumenta immortalitatis sect. 17. προσετέθη πρὸς τὸν λαὸν αὐτοῦ. Sept. Interp. Genesis xxv. 8. 17. xxxv. 29. xlix. 33. Numbers xx. 24. 26. xxvii. 13. xxxi. 2.

[a] Vid. Genesis xviii. 19. Hebrews xi. 10. 17, 18, 19.

[b] "It appears that Enoch preached to the age in which

translation of Enoch would have awakened no reflections, intended as we may sup-

" he lived, the doctrine of a future judgment; his extra-
" ordinary death would be a confirmation of its truth."
Jude 14, 15. *Davison on Prophecy*, p. 122.

Quoniam quidem Enoch placens Deo, in quo placuit corpore translatus est, *translationem justorum præmonstrans*, &c. Irenæus adversus Hæreses, lib. v. cap. 5. p. 439. edit. Paris. 1675.

The ancient fathers do not enter into the question, except incidentally, as to the belief of the Jews in the immortality of the soul, and a future state of rewards and punishments; for it does not appear in the early history of the church to have been much controverted, and the Christian apologists in general allude to it as if it were an acknowledged doctrine of the old dispensation, whether they are writing against Jews or against Gentile philosophers. Thus Eusebius, (Præpar. Evangel. lib. x. xi.) in arguing (with what justice it matters not to the present question) that the Gentile sages borrowed all that is valuable in their writings from the Hebrews, speaking of Plato, observes, " That he derived his notions of the
" soul's immortality from Moses, and that there was no dif-
" ference in their opinions on the subject;" καὶ ἐν τοῖς περὶ ψυχῆς ἀθανασίας, οὐδὲν Μώσεως ὁ Πλάτων διέστηκε τῇ δόξῃ, κ. τ. λ. lib. xi. c. 27. Vigeri edit. Paris. 1628. It is scarcely necessary to remark that the assertion is beyond the truth, but it will at least serve to prove, with many other passages that might be adduced, that Eusebius did not agree with Warburton as to the doctrine either of Plato or the ancient Jews. The argument indeed throughout this treatise, as well as the Demonstratio Evangelica

pose it to have been, since so many patriarchs and righteous men were suffered to die the common death of all men, not so much as a privilege to himself, as a lesson to his own age and succeeding generations. And are all those expressions in the Old Testament, more especially in the Prophets and the Psalms, which appear to us clearly to point to a future life, satisfactorily explained by Warburton, who uniformly interprets the plain as relating to this life only, and the figurative as illustrative of some other truth, to be conveyed through the medium of a figure, which in itself was not intended to be considered as having any foundation in truth [c]? Thus such expres-

clearly evinces, that he did not suppose either the patriarchs or the people of Israel to have looked only to transitory promises.

[c] Divine Legation, book vi. sect. 2. vol. iii. p. 312. Warburton, in combating Dr. Felton's plain and simple principle, that all words used in a figurative sense must first be understood in a literal, adopts the same argument which the opponents of Tertullian made use of when they attempted to refute the doctrine of the resurrection. They asserted that the language of the prophets was to be understood figuratively, to which Tertullian replies, "Si omnia figuræ, quid erit illud cujus figuræ?" In con-

sions as these, *Thy dead men shall live, together with my dead body shall they arise*[d], might be used by the prophet without his conveying, or intending to convey, the notion that his dead body would arise. And that bold and sublime description of the prophet, in which the souls in Hades are represented as rising to meet the king of Babylon at his coming, according to this mode of interpretation, would be considered as intelligible, without the supposition that

firmation, he appeals to the well-known passage in Ezekiel, chap. xxxvii. which they declared to be figurative, and to convey no promise of a resurrection to the house of Israel, but the assurance of temporal prosperity, and the reunion of their scattered tribes; his answer is, "Non "posset de ossibus figura componi si non id ipsum ossi- "bus eventurum esset, nam etsi figmentum veritatis in "imagine est, imago ipsa in veritate est sui." *Tertull. de Resurrect. Carnis* cap. 29, 30, 31. Sculteti Syntagma, cap. 4. sect. 3. Vide Warburton's remarks on the chapter of Ezekiel alluded to, vol. iii. p. 314. book vi. sect. 2. Bishop of Bristol's Eccles. Hist. p. 282.

[d] Isaiah xxvi. 19. Few will agree with the observation of Warburton, that "there was no occasion for the doc- "trine of the resurrection to make the language intelli- "gible." *Warburton*, vol. iii. p. 313; still less, "that an "image is *of more force* for its being *unknown*." p. 314.

Hades existed as a receptacle for souls[e]. *Hell from beneath is moved to meet thee at thy coming; it stirreth up the dead for thee, even all the chief ones of the earth; it hath raised up from their thrones all the kings of the nations. All they shall speak and say unto thee, Art thou also become weak as we? Art thou become like one of us?*

Not to mention many other passages, especially in the Prophets and the Psalms[f], which are sufficient to shew that the idea was prevalent among the Jews, of Hades

[e] Warburton, book vi. sect. 3. p. 337. Isaiah xiv. 9, 10. Warburton always translates *Shêol* the *grave:* but there are above sixty places in the Old Testament where the word occurs, and it is constantly rendered *Hades* by the Seventy, except in one or two places at most. Peters on the Book of Job, p. 322.

"Amongst all the ancients, whether heathens, Jews, or "Christians, the usual acceptation of *hell* was, that it was "the common lodge or habitation of separated souls both "good and bad, wherein each of them, according to their "deserts in this life, and their expectations of the future "judgment, remained either in joy or misery." Vide *Critical History of the Apostles' Creed;* a most able and learned work by an ancestor of the present lord King; art. *Descent into Hell.*

[f] Psalm lxxxvi. 13. Prov. xv. 24. Psalm xvi. 10. Prov. ix. 18. Job xxvi. 6.

being the region of the departed, and that they divided this region, and assigned a different habitation in it for the reception of the righteous and the wicked[g]. Again, the more plain and direct expressions, which are generally understood as referring to a future state, are forced from their natural and obvious sense by the author of the Divine Legation, and restricted in their import to this life only: *Thou wilt not leave my soul in hell, neither wilt thou suffer thine holy One to see corruption*[h], might have signified to the Jews of old, Thou wilt not suffer me to fall immaturely; *The righteous hath hope in his death*[i], The righteous hath hope that he shall be delivered from the most imminent dangers. Nor does the expression, *which have their portion in*

[g] Luke xvi. parable of the rich man and Lazarus. Mr. Peters on the Book of Job, sect. 8.

[h] Psalm xvi. 10. An acquaintance with the opinions of Epiphanius, Athanasius, Origen, and other ancient fathers respecting this text, might have rendered Warburton more cautious in hazarding an interpretation which has no merit but that of novelty to recommend it.

[i] Proverbs xiv. 32.

this life[k], mark, according to such principles of interpretation, any opposition between this life and another. It is needless to multiply other passages of the same kind, which will readily suggest themselves to all who are conversant with the Old Testament, and which no acuteness and ingenuity can explain away. But that celebrated passage in the Book of Job[l], which would seem decisive of the question, I have purposely omitted; because, as many commentators of great knowledge and candour have doubted whether it referred to a future state or not, it would certainly be inadmissible as a proof in a controverted question, till, after a critical examination of the original in connection with the context, its validity as a testimony were fully established. And theologians should ever bear in mind, that no greater injury can be done to the cause of

[k] Psalm xvii. 14.

[l] Job xix. 25. Amid the conflicting opinions of commentators, it is difficult for me to come to any conclusion on the subject. None indeed but a good Hebrew scholar is competent to the investigation: but while any doubt remains, it should not be received as a testimony in a matter of such importance.

truth, especially to that of religious truth, than bringing forward with indiscreet zeal any questionable or doubtful evidence in support of a doctrine. The adversary might adduce it as a confession of weakness in a cause which had recourse to such assistance; a presumption which can never be excited against an argument founded upon a comprehensive view of the general tenor and language of revelation. Nor has any appeal been made to the prophecy of Daniel, because it is allowed by all, that at the time when Daniel wrote the belief of a future state, from whatever cause, was generally prevalent among the Jewish people. Sufficient indications remain, without calling in the aid either of such specific declarations or more doubtful inferences, to convince every diligent and candid inquirer that the ancient fathers of the Jewish church did not look merely to transitory promises; unless we are to believe, that, because they had a legal code with temporal advantages annexed for a particular purpose, they were to close their hearts against the natural reflections which suggested themselves to all

other men, and close their eyes against all the instruction to be derived from the revelation they possessed. Nor does the opinion, that both Jew and Gentile believed in a future state detract from the claims of the gospel as having *brought life and immortality to light.* The Gentiles assented to the truth, they knew not why, from the common apprehensions of nature; but their expectations, though connected with the idea of responsibility and future judgment, were vague and uncertain; and we have seen from the example of the philosophers, who went on for *ever learning, yet never coming to a knowledge of the truth,* how little they could *give a reason of the hope that was in them.* And the Jew, though taught by many a prophetic vision, or instructive narrative, or consoling promise, or significant type, to cherish the hope of the immortal life, which the sin of Adam had forfeited, through the medium of a Deliverer who was to be one of his descendants, had not, and could not have, that distinct and definite knowledge of the nature and method and benefits of redemption which

was reserved till the coming of Him in whom every type and prophecy and promise were to receive their full accomplishment. The Israelite of old, in his journey through the wilderness of life, was strengthened and cheered as he drank of the brook by the way, or of the fountain here and there gushing forth from the rock; but the living well was wanting, whose constant and abundant waters are ever present to us, for the comfort and refreshing of our souls. He was conducted to his eternal inheritance *by a light shining in a dark place*, that pointed out dimly the glories of the future Redeemer, like that *pillar of a cloud* through which the glory of the Lord appeared, and which guided his footsteps through the desert to the possession of his temporal Canaan. In *the fulness of time the Sun of righteousness arose with healing in his wings*, and all those clouds through which the light had shone dimly on the eye of the faithful were dispersed before him. God sent forth his Son proclaiming *peace on earth, and good-will towards men*, revealed clearly in his offices of

Redeemer, Sanctifier, and Mediator, so necessary to the wants, so encouraging to the hopes, so soothing to the apprehensions of man. We need no longer perplex ourselves with difficult questions respecting the soul's immortality: having died to redeem us from iniquity, our Lord rose again from the dead, in order to assure us of eternal life, by teaching us the resurrection of the body; a truth which alone could convey in a satisfactory manner to the understanding of man the doctrine of a future retribution. And if from a sense of our imperfection, we *tremble* at the expectation of *judgment to come*, we may derive encouragement from the assurance that God *hath committed all judgment to the Son*, who himself partook of man's nature, and is touched with a feeling of human infirmity. The speculative disputer may still object that there are many difficulties that perplex, and mysteries not fully explained, and to the finite understanding of man they must ever remain so. There is a progressive order in the dispensations of Almighty Wisdom, which it is

possible may not yet be terminated. As the light which appeared to them of old time was only the dawning of that comparative fulness of light which we now enjoy, Christianity itself may be only the dawning of that perfect light which shall shine upon us in our glorified state; when, in the language of St. Augustin, "the disposition of "them that thirst shall be changed into the "affection of them that taste and are re-"plenished [m]." Instead of indulging in unprofitable speculations, we should place implicit confidence in the benevolence and wisdom of the Deity, and rest persuaded that he has fed us with spiritual food convenient for us, and revealed all that was suitable to the capacities of our moral and intellectual improvement. And instead of giving way to distrust, because every difficulty is not cleared up, and which perhaps to beings constituted as we are, never could be, we should walk forward as men assured of our final inheritance, having our hope in heaven, our labour on earth, our reward in

[m] Hooker's Ecclesiastical Polity, vol. i. p. 259. 8vo. edit.

both: on earth, the inestimable peace of *a conscience void of offence;* and in heaven, that peace with God, the author and finisher of our faith, which indeed passeth all understanding[n].

[n] Dr. Whately, in his ingenious Essay on a Future State, has placed too much reliance on the bold assertions of Warburton; who, with all his learning and dexterity in applying it, is by no means a safe guide. His learning is often superficial, and his reasoning sophistical. Had the author of the Essays on the Peculiarities of Christianity pursued the inquiry independently for himself, with no other aid than the resources of his own candid, vigorous, and argumentative mind, I am satisfied that his discussion on the subject would have been less liable to be mistaken. The words of Aristotle, when criticising the political dreams of his rival in philosophy, may justly be applied to characterize the Divine Legation of Warburton.

Τὸ μὲν ΠΕΡΙΤΤΟΝ ἔχουσι πάντες οἱ λόγοι, καὶ τὸ ΚΑΙΝΟΤΟΜΟΝ, καὶ τὸ ΖΗΤΗΤΙΚΟΝ· καλῶς δὲ πάντα ἴσως χαλεπόν. Pol. Aristot. lib. ii. cap. 4.

APPENDIX.

APPENDIX.

A.

ORPHEUS, Pythagoras, Thales, Anaxagoras, all travelled into other countries, and from thence derived the greater part of their philosophical tenets. The Ægyptian priest observes to Solon in the Timæus [a], Ὦ Σόλων, Σόλων, Ἕλληνες ἀεὶ παῖδές ἐστε, γέρων δὲ Ἕλλην οὐκ ἔστιν, explaining his meaning at the same time by declaring that the Greeks had no ancient doctrine amongst them, no tradition rendered venerable by age. The passages are innumerable in which Plato alludes to this kind of evidence; and he always makes the appeal in the tone of a man who thought that it was entitled to considerable weight. The only exception I recollect (and in this case the common remark is most true, that *exceptio probat regulam*) is the passage in the Timæus, in which, after mentioning the traditions respecting Jupiter, Oceanus, Tethys, &c. he observes, that we ought to assent to them, because they have been handed down from the heroic age; and we must believe the sons of

[a] Plato, Timæus, pars iii. vol. ii. p. 12. Bekker. Eusebius, Præp. Evangel. lib. x. cap. 4.

the gods[b] *though there are no probable or necessary proofs of their assertions.* Warned by the fate of Socrates, he thought it prudent to enumerate among his gods the deities of the popular mythology; but at the same time, from his mode of expressing himself, we have no difficulty in collecting his real sentiments. The author however of the short compressed treatise in the [c] Doric dialect, of which Plato's work above cited is a kind of commentary, speaks of traditions respecting the punishments of a future life as false yet expedient. This must be considered as the sentiment of the Locrian; for it may be proved from his seventh Epistle that Plato's own opinion was very different. [d] In the treatise Περὶ κόσμου, attributed to Aristotle, there is the same appeal made to the ἀρχαῖος λόγος; nor is it important, in regard to the present subject, whether the work be genuine or not. If not written by the Stagyrite, it is evidently a composition of great antiquity[e]:

[b] Ἀδύνατον οὖν θεῶν παισὶν ἀπιστεῖν καί περ ἄνευ τε εἰκότων καὶ ἀναγκαίων ἀποδείξεων λέγουσιν. Plato, Timæus, Bekker, pars iii. vol. ii. p. 42.

[c] Bekker, pars iii. vol. iii. p. 391.

[d] Ἀρχαῖος μὲν οὖν τις λόγος καὶ πάτριός ἐστι πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ὡς ἐκ θεοῦ τὰ πάντα καὶ διὰ θεοῦ ἡμῖν συνέστηκεν. Aristot. Περὶ κόσμου, cap. 6.

[e] In his Metaphysics he speaks of the importance deservedly attributed to this kind of evidence: Τιμιώτατον γὰρ τὸ πρεσβύτατον, lib. i. cap. 3.

and we have similar testimony in works undoubtedly his own.

The early fathers of the church, in their controversies with the Greek philosophers, always accuse them of having borrowed their knowledge from foreign countries, principally from Egypt, and refer through this channel the wisdom of the ancients to divine revelation as its source [f].

B.

The assertion in the text, that Plato believed the Deity to have created matter out of nothing, has appeared to me, upon further examination, more than dubious. The younger Platonists, Clemens Alexandrinus, Ficinus, and Cudworth, main-

Παραδέδοται ὑπὸ τῶν ΑΡΧΑΙΩΝ καὶ ΠΑΛΑΙΩΝ ὅτι θεοί τε εἰσὶν οὗτοι καὶ περιέχει τὸ θεῖον τὴν ὅλην φύσιν. Met. lib. xiv. c. 8.

Vide also de Cœlo. Διόπερ, καλῶς ἔχει συμπειθεῖν ἑαυτὸν τοὺς ΑΡΧΑΙΟΥΣ ΑΛΗΘΕΙΣ εἶναι λόγους. Lib. ii. c. 1.

Diogenes Laertius, at the commencement of his work, cites a treatise of Aristotle in which philosophy was represented to have derived its origin from the *Magi* of Persia, the *Chaldæans* of Babylon, the *Gymnosophists* of India, and the *Druids* of Gaul. Diog. Laert. procemium, p. 1.

Cicero also speaks of the same kind of testimony. Tusc. Quæst. lib. i. cap. 12, 13. 17.

[f] Vide Mr. Lancaster's Supplementary Remarks, p. 422. and a learned Charge by Waterland in the 8th vol. of his Works; Van Mildert's edit. Eusebius, Præp. Evangelica, lib. x.

tain this opinion; but their view of Plato's sentiments is disproved by the statements of [g] Cicero and Aristotle; and the Timæus alone appears sufficient to shew that he held the eternity of matter; nor has Serranus been successful in labouring to prove that his assertions are to be considered as applying only to the archetype of matter, and not to matter visible and corporeal. It is also worthy of remark, that the fathers, in their refutation of the Pagans, almost uniformly object to them their ignorance of the creation of matter. Thus Athanasius[h] rebukes the Platonists for representing the world to have been created out of preexisting matter. Epiphanius[i], in his treatise against Hæreses, accuses Plato of holding contradictory language on the subject, sometimes speaking of matter as created, at others, as coeternal with the Deity. Eusebius[k], in his Præparatio Evangel., asserts the superiority of Hebrew theology in its declaring that God had made all things,

[g] Cic. Academ. Quæst. lib. iv. 37. Δύο γὰρ ἀρχάς φησι δοκεῖ ποιεῖν ὁ Πλάτων, τὸ μὲν ὑποκείμενον καὶ ὕλην προσαγορεύων, τὸ δέ ὡς αἴτιον καὶ κινοῦν ὁ θεὸν καλεῖ καὶ νοῦν. Simplicius in Aristot. Phys. lib. i. p. 19. ed. Aldus, 1526.

[h] Ἄλλοι δὲ ἐν οἷς ἐστι καὶ ὁ μέγας παρ' Ἕλλησι Πλάτων, ἐκ προϋποκειμένης καὶ ἀγενήτου ὕλης πεποιηκέναι τὸν θεὸν τὰ ὅλα διηγοῦνται. De Incarnatione, p. 48. edit. Benedict. Paris. 1698.

[i] Epiphanius adversus Hæreses, lib. i. cap. 6.

[k] Præparatio Evangelica, lib. vii. cap. 18—22.

and also the matter out of which they were made.

C.

Warburton boldly asserts that all the ancient philosophers embraced the principle, that it was lawful and expedient to deceive for the public good[1]: and Tully, on the authority of Plato, thinks it so clear, that he calls the doing otherwise *nefas*, "a horrid wickedness." As this statement appeared contrary to the whole tenor of Plato's writings, I was for some time at a loss to conceive what treatise of the philosopher could be alluded to. I have no doubt, however, that the assertion is grounded on a doubtful translation by Cicero of a passage in the Timæus[m]. Plato hav-

[1] Divine Legation, book iii. sect. 2. vol. ii. p. 13. Warburton gives no reference to the treatise in Tully where the sentence is to be found.

[m] Τὸν μὲν οὖν ποιητὴν καὶ πατέρα τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς εὑρεῖν τε ἔργον καὶ εὑρόντα εἰς πάντας ΑΔΥΝΑΤΟΝ λέγειν. Timæus, p. 23. Bekker.

Difficile est invenire Conditorem hujus mundi et inventum evulgare *nefas*. *Ciceronianum Lexicon Græcolatinum*, ab Hen. Stephano, 1557. Platonis Loci Interp. p. 13.

Eusebius praises Plato for this reverence in speaking of the Deity, as teaching, like the Hebrew scriptures, ἄῤῥητον εἶναι τὸ θεῖον. Præp. Evangel. lib. xi. c. 12.

In the same book, cap. 29, Eusebius cites the above passage from Plato; and in the Latin translation by Vigerus the word *nefas* is used. The fact is, *nefas* is not an improper term; but

ing declared that it is very difficult to discover the Deity, and, when we have discovered him, that it is impossible to reveal him to all men, Cicero has rendered the word, not by *impossible*, but *nefas*. Yet upon this interpretation of Cicero's, or rather misconception on the part of Warburton of the proper meaning belonging to *nefas*[n] in the passage, aided by an unwarrantable extension of a sentiment limited in its application into a general principle, Warburton has attempted to establish an hypothesis which would annihilate at once all that is excellent in Plato's philosophy. There is no author, ancient or modern, who appears to devote himself with greater ardour to the pursuit of truth[o]. It is the continual object of his aspirations. And there are very few occasions in which he allows of its being sacrificed to expediency, and then only for a particular purpose. Thus, in the third book of the Republic, he proposes to banish poets from his

Warburton misunderstood its meaning. Eusebius, Vigeri edit. Paris. 1628.

[n] Vide the word ἀδύνατον (Timæus, p. 42.) in the passage cited in the Appendix, note A.

[o] Οὐκ οἶσθα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι τό γε ὡς ἀληθῶς ψεῦδος, εἰ οἷόν τε τοῦτο εἰπεῖν, πάντες θεοί τε καὶ ἄνθρωποι μισοῦσιν; De Repub. Bekker, p. 103.

Ψεῦδος μηδεὶς μηδὲν μήτε λόγῳ, μήτε ἔργῳ πράξειε. Plato, quoted by Blackwall, Sacred Classics, vol. ii. p. 103. ed. 1731.

ideal commonwealth because they teach not truth, but the images of truth; and he asserts that truth is always to be upheld as an object of great consequence: Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἀλήθειάν γε περὶ πολλοῦ ποιητέον[p]. He permits however the governors of the city to make use of deceit, either for the sake of the citizens, or on account of the enemies; meaning probably for the good of the citizens, more especially against the enemies of the state[q]: Τοῖς ἄρχουσι δὴ τῆς πόλεως, εἴ πέρ τισιν ἄλλοις, προσήκει ψεύδεσθαι ἢ πολεμίων ἢ πολιτῶν ἕνεκα ἐπ' ὠφελείᾳ τῆς πόλεως: but a private person is forbidden to practise it. Let us suppose then that Plato, while writing his Republic, considered himself as enjoying the privileges of a magistrate[r], and entitled, at the very time he dismisses the poets for giving false representations of gods and men, to inculcate falsehoods respecting the rewards and punishments of another life, provided the tendency of his fictions was beneficial. How comes it, that not in the Republic and the Laws only, but in works strictly philosophical, he holds out the same prospect of retribution after death?

[p] De Repub. Bekker, pars iii. vol. i. p. 112.

[q] De Repub. p. 112.

[r] Yet this supposition, which is allowed for the sake of argument, will not be entertained by any one who recollects the concluding pages in the second book of the Republic.

Is he writing as a legislator in the Phædo an account of the death of Socrates?

In the Crito, a narrative of his refusal to escape from prison?

In the Apologia, his defence before his judges?

In the Timæus, a philosophical description of the creation of the world?

In the Phædrus, a discussion on the difference between the truly beautiful and the image of it?

In the Gorgias, a treatise on rhetoric?

D.

It would appear from the writings of Plato himself, as well as from other testimonies, that there were secret and esoteric[s] doctrines reserved for select disciples, which were intended to explain more fully the obscurer parts of his philosophy. This seems to be the meaning of the passage in the seventh Epistle, in which, apparently jealous that accounts of his instructions had been made public without his sanction, he declares (evincing at the same time, as may be perceived from the tone of his feelings, a desire to magnify the value of these hidden precepts) that there were some things which he never had written, and which he never would write; and without

[s] Brucker, vol. i. p. 660. Plato, Phædrus, Epist. 2. 7. 13. De Repub. lib. iv. Bekker, p. 179.

these, his common instructions could not in many points be clearly understood.

It is easy to suppose him having in view those passages in his writings in which he makes vague and obscure allusions to some apparently sublime truth, and then hastens on, without dwelling farther on the subject, to sentences like that in the Phædrus, where, after describing in a wild and mystical style the happiness belonging to different orders of spiritual beings, he hints at some more exalted and perfect felicity confined to the Deity alone, and which no poet[t] had ever yet described or could worthily describe. But there is no foundation for believing, that though his philosophical writings might sometimes admit of a *fuller* sense, they were therefore intended to bear a *double* sense, and that the very same words were calculated to convey to different classes of readers two meanings opposite to each other. Yet it is upon such a theory that we are to imagine Plato (according to Warburton's views) not merely keeping back something in his obscure representations, but absolutely disbelieving[u] his plain and positive

[t] Τὸν δὲ ὑπερουράνιον τόπον οὔ τέ τις ὕμνησέ πω τῶν τῇδε ποιητὴς οὔ τέ ποθ' ὑμνήσει κατ' ἀξίαν. Phædrus, Bekker, pars i. vol. i. p. 42.

[u] Cicero thought differently of Plato's belief on the subject. Ut enim rationem Plato nullam afferret (vide quid homini tribuam) ipsa auctoritate me frangeret. Tot autem rationes attu-

statements, and having no conviction of a future state of personal consciousness, though he never fails in every treatise to inculcate it. A species of literary Machiavellianism (as it has been called) so extravagant, if not impossible, as this, and so directly opposed to all the notions which a sober-minded man would imbibe from a general view of the tendency of Plato's writings, would require the strongest evidence for its support. And the supposition is at once disproved, as far as his belief of a future state is concerned, by a reference to his Epistles; those private Epistles, in which (as Warburton properly remarks) a man speaks his sentiments without disguise; nay, to the very same Epistles which are appealed to for the theory of a double sense, and which, if they do contain it, prevent its application to the question of a future retribution, by their containing also other passages in which the philosopher decidedly expresses his conviction of individual consciousness after death[x]. In fact, nothing can be more la-

lit, ut velle ceteris, *sibi certe persuasisse* videatur. *Tusc. Quæst.* lib. i. c. 21.

[x] Ὁ δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ τεκμήριον ποιοῦμαι ὅτι ἔστι τις αἴσθησις τοῖς τεθνεῶσι τῶν ἐνθάδε. αἱ γὰρ βέλτισται ψυχαὶ ΜΑΝΤΕΥΟΝΤΑΙ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν. αἱ δὲ μοχθηρόταται οὔ φασι, κυρίωτερα δὲ τὰ τῶν θείων ἀνδρῶν μαντεύματα ἢ τὰ τῶν μή. Epist. 2. ad Dionys. Bekker, p. 400.

Πείθεσθαι δὲ ὄντως ἀεὶ χρὴ τοῖς παλαιοῖς τε καὶ ἱεροῖς λόγοις οἳ δὴ μηνύουσιν ἡμῖν ΑΘΑΝΑΤΟΝ ΨΥΧΗΝ ΕΙΝΑΙ ΔΙΚΑΣΤΑΣ ΤΕ ΙΣΧΕΙΝ

boured and unsatisfactory than the bishop's arguments on the subject. The Epistles which he cites would by no means prove the truth of the general principle itself, omitting the question of its application, but only the partial adoption of such an expedient for a specific object[y]: and most of the other testimonies may be dismissed at once. Such writers as Jamblichus and Synesius are of very little value in determining such a question. The latter was a Christian bishop of the fifth century; and, as he refused to surrender his heretical notions respecting the soul to the testimony of the written word of God, it is very possible that his interpretations of philosophy might be equally at variance with the actual statements of Plato. And Jamblichus, with all the Platonists of the Alexandrian school[z], (though they by no means universally support Warburton's views,) made it their object to misrepresent the doctrines of their Master. By the convenient theory of a double sense, of which they constituted themselves the inter-

ΚΑΙ ΤΙΝΕΙΝ ΤΑΣ ΜΕΓΙΣΤΑΣ ΤΙΜΩΡΙΑΣ ΟΤΑΝ ΤΙΣ ΑΠΑΛΛΑΧΘΗ ΤΟΥ ΣΩΜΑΤΟΣ. Epist. 7. p. 448.

[y] Warburton, book iii. sect. 2. 3. 4.

[z] Plotinus, the most acute of them all, never supposed that the unity of the universal Soul excluded the idea of separate consciousness after death, or of personal identity in the individuals who were parts of it. 4th Ennead, Plotinus, 9th book, ch. 1. 7th book, ch. 15.

preters, they were enabled to make any discoveries they pleased: hence it is, that while plain and intelligible accounts were rejected, as intended for the vulgar only, the most obscure and indistinct conceptions were spiritualized into sublime truths; and the sacred mystery of the Trinity, and other doctrines of Christianity, were unfolded to the prophetic eye of Porphyry and Plotinus in the discussions of the Academy; till by these and similar methods the dark oracles of paganism were exalted into a perfect rule of truth and wisdom, to the disparagement of the clear revelations of Christianity. If we give the author of the Divine Legation the full benefit of [a] Numenius's testimony, (of whose writings only a few fragments remain preserved in Origen and Eusebius, which do not sanction his opinions,) on the supposition, gratuitouly assumed, that the lost works of this Pythagorean and Platonist would have supported his view of

[a] Numenius is mentioned by Origen contra Celsum, lib. v. pp. 258. 269. edit. Spencer. 1677; also Opiniones de Anima, p. 629. edit. Paris. 1618. Eusebius, Præp. Evang. lib. xi. contains Numenius's sentiments; περὶ τοῦ δευτέρου αἰτίου (cap. 18.); περὶ τἀγαθοῦ (cap. 22.). This philosopher, as well as Plotinus, is fond of using the expressions "the Father" and "the Son," (by the Son meaning the Δημιουργὸς,) to designate the first and second Deities of their own, not Plato's theological system. This was done with the view of making philosophy speak as much as possible the language of revealed truth.

the question; it is impossible, in discussing a subject of so much interest, to pass over without notice the observations which he makes on a passage quoted from Plato's Epinomis. The whole comment exhibits a singular instance of the blind partiality of a writer when advocating a favourite hypothesis. The elegant ambiguity of which Warburton speaks has no foundation, except in his own fancy: the words admit but of one meaning consistent with the general tenor of Plato's writings and the rules of just interpretation. In proposing to render ἐκ πολλῶν ἕνα[b], referring to the word αἰσθήσεων, which occurs in the previous clause, that of many sensations he has only one left, the bishop has fully proved how much his acuteness and ingenuity surpassed his acquaintance with the

[b] Divine Legation, book iii. sect. 3. vol. ii. p. 65.

The passage alluded to is as follows; Ὃν καὶ διισχυρίζομαι παίζων καὶ σπουδάζων ἅμα, ὅτε θανάτῳ τις τῶν τοιούτων τὴν αὑτοῦ μοῖραν ἀναπλήσει, σχεδὸν ἐάν περ ἔτ' ἀποθανὼν ᾖ, μήτε μεθέξειν ἔτι πολλῶν τότε καθά περ νῦν αἰσθήσεων, μιᾶς τε μοίρας μετειληφότα μόνον καὶ ΕΚ ΠΟΛΛΩΝ ΈΝΑ ΓΕΓΟΝΟΤΑ εὐδαίμονά τε ἔσεσθαι καὶ σοφώτατον ἅμα καὶ μακάριον—here Warburton concludes: the sentence continues thus; εἴ τέ ΤΙΣ ΕΝ ΗΠΕΙΡΟΙΣ ΕΙΤ' ΕΝ ΝΗΣΟΙΣ ΜΑΚΑΡΙΟΣ ΩΝ ΖΗΙ, κἀκεῖνον μεθέξειν τῆς τοιαύτης ἀεὶ τύχης. Epinomis, Bekker, pars iii. vol. iii. p. 374.

It is evident that the phrase ἐκ πολλῶν ἕνα γεγονότα alludes to the doctrine of Plato, that the soul was uniform and uncompounded, μονοειδής, as distinguished from the body which was compounded. Vid. Phædo, Bekker, pars ii. vol. iii. p. 50.

elementary principles of grammar, a far more humble, yet more necessary instrument in the investigation of ancient learning. And if he had pursued his inquiry to the end of the sentence, he would have observed that the words immediately following the part quoted could hardly fail to convey the notion of that personal consciousness for the denial of which he appeals to the passage as a testimony. It is perhaps unnecessary to dwell longer on this sentence; for there is some reason to doubt whether the Epinomis was written by Plato. The Epistles appealed to in favour of a double sense are generally the 2d, the 7th, and the 13th. The meaning of the seventh has been before alluded to. The second contains a kind of cipher, expressive of the Deity, written with the view, as Plato himself declares, that if the letter miscarried either by land or sea, the reader into whose hands it should chance to fall might not understand the import, a precaution not altogether unnecessary if we recollect the polytheism of the times, and the fate of Socrates his master: the words are these: [c] *Φραστέον δή σοι δι' αἰνιγμῶν, ἵν' ἄν τι ἡ δέλτος ἢ πόντου ἢ γῆς ἐν πτυχαῖς πάθῃ, ὁ ἀναγνοὺς μὴ γνῷ. Ὧδε γὰρ ἔχει. Περὶ τὸν πάντων βασιλέα πάντ' ἐστὶ καὶ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα πάντα, καὶ ἐκεῖνο αἴτιον ἁπάντων τῶν καλῶν. δεύτερον*

[c] Bekker, pars iii. vol. iii. p. 403.

δὲ περὶ τὰ δεύτερα, καὶ τρίτον περὶ τὰ τρίτα. This passage is distinguished by a peculiarity of style which awakens strong suspicions against its being genuine. The founder of the Academy is mystical, but he seldom gives utterance to his mysticism in this kind of language. It will be observed also, that there is a difference of construction between the former part of the sentence περὶ τὸν πάντων βασιλέα, and the two concluding clauses. In the first instance the περὶ is made to refer to the person, in the latter to the thing. But to enter into any investigation as to the genuineness of the passage would involve a critical discussion on the general character of Plato's Epistles. And though the decision of the question might have some weight in determining the meaning we attach to the words before us, the theory of a double sense would not be in the least affected by such a consideration. For whether genuine or not, they were intended to convey obscurely one sense only; and to those who did not understand them they would have no signification at all. If we suppose the sentence spurious, it was probably interpolated by those who wished to represent Plato as teaching doctrines equivalent to the Christian revelation of the Trinity; if really written by the philosopher, an interpretation must be sought accordant with the acknowledged principles conveyed in his works,

in which the Trinity is certainly not to be found[d]. The account of creation, given in the Timæus, will furnish a probable explanation. The clause περὶ τὸν πάντων βασιλέα may be considered as alluding to the *chief Deity*, Creator and Sovereign of all things: the *second*, who has *secondary* objects committed to his charge, may be referred to the universe: the *third Intelligence*, who has a *third* department allotted, was perhaps intended to designate man himself, whose formation and final destiny, as of a being distinguished for piety and wisdom, Plato describes with great pomp and diffuseness, and who, in the language of ancient philosophers, was often represented as a type of the world[e]. It is true that Eusebius refers the whole passage to the blessed Trinity, and censures the interpretation of the Platonists[f], who explain it by that favourite system which they invented for themselves of the *first* God, the Father of all things; the *second* Deity, the Δημιουργὸς; and the

[d] An account of the supposed Platonic Trinity will be found in Cudworth, lib. i. c. 4. p. 406.

[e] μικροκόσμος.

[f] Ταῦτα οἱ τὸν Πλάτωνα διασαφεῖν πειρώμενοι ἐπὶ τὸν πρῶτον Θεὸν ἀνάγουσιν, ἐπί τε τὸ δεύτερον αἴτιον, καὶ τρίτον τὴν τοῦ κόσμου ψυχὴν, Θεὸν τρίτον καὶ αὐτὴν ὁριζόμενοι εἶναι. οἱ δέ γε θεῖοι λόγοι τὴν ἁγίαν καὶ μακαρίαν τριάδα. κ. τ. λ. Eusebius, Præparat. Evangel. lib. xi. cap. 20. Vide also lib. xi. cap. 17. where the passage is again cited in an extract from Plotinus.

third, the soul of the world. But it must be remembered that the bitter opposition of the one party to Christianity, and the injudicious arguments of the other in its favour, render the testimony of both on such a subject of little value. With regard to the sentence in the 13th Epistle, in which the writer professes to give a key to expressions which he might make use of respecting the name of the Deity, *τῆς μὲν γὰρ σπουδαίας* Ἐπιστολῆς ΘΕΟΣ *ἄρχει*, ΘΕΟΙ *δὲ τῆς ἥττον*, it may be sufficient to observe, that the reason before alluded to, viz. the fear lest his letters should miscarry, would account for the adoption of such an expedient. These words, notwithstanding the testimony of Eusebius[g] in their favour, can furnish no proof either of a double sense in Plato's writings, or of his belief in the unity of the Godhead, for it is undeniable that in his works the terms *Θεὸς* and *Θεοὶ* are used indiscriminately[h].

E.

In considering the opinions of the ancient philosophers respecting the absorption of the soul after death into the one Spirit of the universe, it is important to keep in view the distinction of the

[g] Præparat. Evangel. lib. xi. cap. 13.

[h] Socrates uses the terms *Godhead* and the *Gods* without distinction in his works generally. Aristipps Briefe, Wieland, book i. p. 114.

several schools, and not to cite passages from M. Antoninus or Seneca as illustrative of the doctrines of all, but as confined in their application to that sect only of which the writers were members.

The truth may briefly be stated thus: Plato, if the testimony of his own writings can be relied on, never entertained the notion that death brought with it the extinction of individual consciousness.

Of Aristotle the opinions are more dubious; yet there is nothing in his works which, if well considered, ought to destroy the positive testimony given in the Ethics of his belief that the dead are affected by the fortunes of their living friends [i].

Of Pythagoras [k] there is no positive evidence by which we can absolutely determine his notions on the subject.

The most distinguished philosophers among the Stoics differed from each other. Antoninus and Epictetus avowedly maintained the absorption of the human soul at its separation from the body into the Soul of the world, and the extinction of consciousness; and it appears from some passages in the Epistles of Seneca [l] that he was of the same

[i] Ethics, lib. i. c. 11.

[k] Tennemann Geschichte der Philosophie, s. 94. Brucker, Hist. Crit. Phil. p. 1039.

[l] Brucker, pp. 951, 952, 953. Senecæ Consolatio ad Marciam, cap. 19. conf. cap. 25. Epist. 54. Mors est, non esse. Id quale sit, jam scio: hoc erit post me quod ante me fuit.

opinion; though at other times he dilates most admirably on the happiness to be enjoyed after death in the society of the gods. The prevailing doctrine of the sect seems to have been, that the souls of the virtuous and philosophical would become inhabitants of the stars, and exist till the periodical conflagration of the universe[m]; but that those of the wicked would endure only for a certain interval, and then be dispersed into the air. Cleanthes, however, and some others, maintained that all equally, the bad as well as the good, would survive till this revolution of things.

The Epicureans disbelieved altogether that the soul survived the body.

The middle and new Academy and the sceptics cannot be said to have had any belief, for they had no fixed opinions at all.

At the risk of appearing tedious, I shall venture a few more observations on the different senses in which the doctrine of the Anima Mundi was held

Quæris, quo jaceas post obitum loco
Quo non nata jacent. *Seneca tragicus.*

[m] Τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν γεννητήν τε φθαρτὴν λέγουσιν· οὐκ εὐθὺς δὲ τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγεῖσαν φθείρεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐπιμένειν τινὰς χρόνους καθ' ἑαυτήν· τὴν μὲν τῶν σπουδαίων μέχρι τῆς εἰς πῦρ ἀναλύσεως τῶν πάντων. Euseb. Præp. Evang. lib. xv. cap. 20. Cicero, Tusc. Quæst. lib. i. 32.

Κλεάνθης μὲν οὖν πάσας (ψυχὰς) ἐπιδιαμένειν μέχρις ἐκπυρώσεως. Diog. Laërtius, lib. vii. p. 291. edit. 1570.

by the different sects. The notion appears to have prevailed at an early period in Asia and Egypt, and it was from this latter country, probably, that it was introduced into Greece, and became subject to various modifications as it passed through the several schools.

[n] The opinions of Orpheus, before Greek philosophy was yet formed into a system, according to the most favourable supposition, were, that God was originally connected with matter, but that he expelled it from him, and that what was before one nature was divided into two; yet at the same time he does not appear to have altogether emancipated the Deity of his belief from the mass of matter which he pervaded and guided. [o] The notions of the Ionic school afterwards were probably not very different from this, till the time of Anaxagoras, who entertained nobler and more elevated views of the divine Mind than his predecessors [p].

[n] The opinions attributed to Orpheus seem to have been, that the world was an emanation from God; and Brucker also thinks that he held this efflux of matter to be a part of God: this has however been disputed: "Deum ante mundi-"tum conditum cum chao infinite copulatum fuisse et ita con-"junctum ut omnia continuerit. Expulisse vero Deum ex "sinu suo materiam." *Brucker*, pars ii. lib. i. cap. 1. p. 390.

[o] Brucker, pars ii. lib. i. pp. 470—490. Tennemann. Speculation der Ionier.

[p] Καὶ πρῶτος τῇ ὕλῃ νοῦν ἐπεστήσεν—πάντα χρήματα ἦν ὁμοῦ εἶτα

He taught that the essence of God had never been united with matter, and was now totally distinct from it; at the same time that he pervaded all things, and set them in order; a belief not very far removed from the Christian doctrine of the omnipresence.

According to Cudworth, Pythagoras held nearly the same sentiments as those above ascribed to Orpheus: but Brucker combats this opinion, and degrades his philosophy to pure atheism or Spinozism [q]. The fact is, that the treatises from which

ΝΟΥΣ ἐλθὼν αὐτὰ διεκόσμησε· παρὸ καὶ νοῦς ἐπεκλήθη. Diog. Laërt. in Anaxag. p. 51. edit. 1570. Idem, proœmium, p. 2.

ΝΟΥΝ καὶ θεὸν πρῶτος ἐπαγαγόμενος τῇ κοσμοποιΐᾳ. Themistius, quoted by Cudworth, p. 380.

Νοῦς ΜΕΜΙΚΤΑΙ οὐδενὶ χρήματι· ἀλλὰ μόνος αὐτός ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἐστίν. Anaxagoras in Simplicio. Comment. Aristot. Phys. lib. i. p. 33.

Τῆς δὲ κινήσεως καὶ τῆς γενέσεως αἴτιον ἐπέστησε τὸν ΝΟΥΝ ὁ Ἀναξαγόρας. Simplicius, p. 12.

Ὡς ἄρα ΝΟΥΣ ἐστὶν ὁ διακοσμῶν τε καὶ πάντων αἴτιος. Socrates speaking of Anaxagoras, Plato, Phædo, Bekker, p. 85.

Aperta simplexque mens. *Cicero de Natura Deorum* lib. i. c. 11. Academ. Quæstionum lib. iv. c. 37.

Qua sententia proxime ad Christianorum dogma accesserit, qui Deum docent per res omnes commeare ut cum nulla tamen ullo modo misceatur. *Brucker*, pars ii. lib. ii. cap. 1. p. 507.

[q] Qualis ille Deus Pythagoricus, nempe ignis mundi subtilissimus. *Brucker*, p. 1077.

That he held an *incorporeal* Deity, distinct from the world, is a thing not questioned by any Cudworth, p. 21.

Vide Aristot. de Anima, ἔφασάν τινες αὐτῶν ψυχὴν εἶναι τὰ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι ξύσματα, οἱ δὲ τὸ ταῦτα κινοῦν, lib. i. cap. 2.

a knowledge of the Pythagorean principles is to be derived differ from each other. Timæus the Locrian supports the view taken by Cudworth, but Ocellus Lucanus asserts that the world was neither created nor arranged [r], having had no origin, and destined to have no end: and in another passage he seems to consider it as the Deity and the Cause of all things. The Eleatic school identified God with the world. [s] Plato refined upon the doctrines of Pythagoras, and taught the more elevated philosophy of Anaxagoras, in separating the supreme Deity from matter: and though he makes a divinity of the law of nature, by assigning a divine Intelligence or Soul to the world, who guides and directs it to artificial ends, he

[r] Δοκεῖ γὰρ μοι τὸ πᾶν ἀνώλεθρον εἶναι καὶ ἀγένητον ἀεί τε γὰρ ἦν καὶ ἔσται. Ocellus Lucanus, Gale, Opusc. Mythol. cap. 1. p. 506. edit. 1688.

Ὁ δέ γε ΚΟΣΜΟΣ, αἴτιός ἐστι τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῦ εἶναι καὶ τοῦ σώζεσθαι, καὶ τοῦ αὐτοτελῆ εἶναι. p. 510.

Conf. p. 531. Τὰς ὀρέξεις ΥΠΟ ΤΟΥ ΘΕΟΥ διδομένας—καθ' ἕκαστον, ἀναπλήρωσεν Ο ΘΕΟΣ. Vide also Justin Martyr, Brucker, 1075.

[s] Timæus, passim.

Alcinous, as interpreter of Plato's doctrines, gives the following description of the Deity: Πατὴρ δέ ἐστι τῷ αἴτιος εἶναι πάντων καὶ κοσμεῖν τὸν οὐράνιον νοῦν καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ κόσμου πρὸς ἑαυτὸν καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἑαυτοῦ νοήσεις. κατὰ γὰρ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ΒΟΥΛΗΣΙΝ ἐμπέπληκε πάντα ἑαυτοῦ, τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ κόσμου ἐπεγείρας καὶ εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἐπιστρέψας τοῦ νοῦ αὐτῆς αἴτιος ὑπάρχων. ὃς κοσμηθεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς διακοσμεῖ σύμπασαν φύσιν ἐν τῷδε τῷ κόσμῳ. Alcinous, cap. 10.

never confounds this secondary god with the one first Cause and Creator of all things.

In the works of Aristotle, few as the indications are which they afford of his opinions on the subject, it is not impossible to discover that he does not confound the Deity with the universe[t]. In the Politics he clearly marks the distinction between the two ideas, and in his metaphysical works, the same distinction may be traced.

Among the followers of Plato in the Academy, no important deviation from his system is to be perceived[u]. The statements of Xenocrates and Polemo are far from being irreconcileable with the principles inculcated by the founder of the school.

Into the doctrines of the middle and new Academy it is unnecessary to enter, because, as

[t] Aristot. Pol. lib. vii. cap. 3. Σχολὴ γὰρ ἂν Ο ΘΕΟΣ ἔχοι καλῶς καὶ ΠΑΣ Ο ΚΟΣΜΟΣ οἷς οὐκ εἰσὶν ἐξωτερίκαι πράξεις παρὰ τὰς οἰκείας τὰς αὐτῶν. Vid. also Metaphys. lib. xiv. cap. 7. in which the Deity is said to be ἀΐδιος, ἀκινήτος, κεχωρισμένος τῶν αἰσθητῶν, ἀμερὴς καὶ ἀδιαίρετος.—De Cœlo, lib. ii. cap. 1. In which Aristotle argues, that if the Deity were confounded with the universe, he would have the fate of Ixion.

[u] Brucker, pp. 738. 742. Cudworth, Intellect. Syst. cap. 4. sect. 24. p. 418. Speusippus autem et Xenocrates qui primi Platonis rationem auctoritatemque susceperant et post hos Polemo, et Crates unaque Crantor in Academia congregati diligenter ea quæ a superioribus acceperant, tuebantur. *Cicero, Academ. Quæst.* lib. i. cap. 9.

was before remarked, they virtually made it their principle to have no established system [x], and they are therefore justly classed by Warburton with professed Pyrrhonists.

The Peripatetics by no means uniformly adhered to the tenets of their master, and one of them, Strato Lampsacenus [y], is distinguished for having plunged into a depth of atheism beyond that of any other philosophical teacher, and to have inculcated more degrading notions respecting the Deity than those of the Stoics; for he maintained that there was no other God than a kind of plastic life in nature, without sense or consciousness. The Stoics, like Strato, considered God and matter to form one nature inseparably united, but they maintained the existence (if such a difference between these two forms of atheism can clearly be conceived) of a kind of divine reason,

[x] *Opinabor* was their professed principle: Quæro enim, quid sit, quod comprehendi possit—Incognito nimirum assentiar, id est, *opinabor*. *Cic. Academ. Quæst.* lib. iv. 35.

[y] A short account of Strato's life, but not of his doctrines, is given in Diog. Laërt. and his works also are enumerated: he succeeded Theophrastus in his school, and had been preceptor to Ptolemy Philadelphus, Diog. Laërt. p. 186. He is described by St. Augustine as something between an atheist and a theist. For his opinions, vide Cudworth, lib. i. cap. 3. sect. 4. p. 107. Brucker, pars ii. lib. ii. cap. 7. pp. 845—847. Cicero de Natura Deorum, lib. i. cap. 13. Academ. Quæst. lib. i. cap. 9. lib. iv. cap. 38.

divina ratio toti mundo insita[z], while their rivals above alluded to allowed the divinity of plastic force only. The distinction must be considered more verbal than real[a], if we remember that the god of the Stoics, notwithstanding the magnificent language in which they sometimes extol him, was corporeal made up of fire and liquid ether, finite, inseparably united to matter, and subject to its control, without free-will, and apparently without personality. They taught that the soul of man was a part of the divine essence, a πνεῦμα ἔνθερμον[b], that it partook of the same qualities, was an emanation from it, and, after the destined period, would be resolved into it[c], when the eternal law of fate,

[z] Zeno autem *naturalem legem divinam* esse censet. Aliis autem libris rationem quandam, per omnem naturam rerum pertinentem ut divinam esse affectam (divina vi affectam) putat. *Cicero, de Natura Deorum,* lib. i. cap. 14. ratione mundus utitur. Animans est mundus composque rationis. lib. ii. cap. 8.

[a] Brucker, pars ii. lib. ii. cap. 9. p. 937. Tennemann, Stoiker, s. 121. Diog. Laërt. lib. vii. De Natura Deorum, Cicero, lib. i. lib. ii. cap. 14, 15. Academ. Quæst. lib. iv. cap. 41. Cudworth, lib. i. cap. 4. p. 419. Eusebius, Præparat. Evangel. lib. xv. cap. 15, 16. S. Epiphanii Responsio ad Epist. Acacii et Pauli, p. 7. Adv. Hæreses. lib. i. 5.

[b] Diog. Laërt. lib. vii. p. 291.

[c] Ἀρέσκει δὲ τοῖς πρεσβυτατοῖς τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς αἱρέσεως ταύτης ἐξαεροῦσθαι πάντα κατὰ περιόδους τινὰς τὰς μέγισταις εἰς πῦρ αἰθερῶδες ἀναλυομένων πάντων. Eusebius, Præp. Evangel. lib. xv. cap. 18. Idem

from similar principles, would again produce similar combinations; a new universe would arise from its elementary fire, destined to become in the developement of all its successive phenomena, physical and moral, whether trifling or important, the exact counterpart of the old: from the eruption of volcanoes, or the convulsion of empires, to the smallest blade of grass, and the most minute accident in the character and fortunes of every individual that before existed.

[d] The opinions of Epicurus are too well known to require examination. The Romans were copyists of the Greek philosophers, rather than inventors of independent systems, and in the interpretation of their sentiments they are frequently superficial, and not always to be relied on. In the time of Cicero the philosophy of Epicurus, of the Stoics, and of the old and new Academy, was most studied. Cicero himself, next to the works of the new Academy, his own sect, was most conversant in the writings of the Stoics. In speaking of Aristotle he observes, that his philosophy was little read even by the learned [e]. It appears that those

cap. 19. Diog. Laërt. lib. vii. p. 284. edit. 1570. Warburton, book iii. sect. 3. vol. ii. p. 72. Vide also Origen contra Celsum, lib. v. p. 244, 245. edit. Spencer. 1677. Even Socrates's worn out clothes were to appear again in this regeneration.

[d] Cicero de Natura Deorum lib. i.

[e] Rhetor autem ille magnus hæc Aristotelica se ignorare re-

Romans in general who believed in a supreme Deity identified him with the Soul of the universe. [f] Varro undoubtedly had no other notion of Jupiter, and he may be considered as representing the principles prevalent in his time. The later Platonists of the school of Ammonius were lost in the dreams of oriental speculation. Plotinus, like Spinoza, afterwards seems to have maintained that God was no existence himself, but the cause of all existence [g], and that matter, soul, and God were inseparable, and had been so from all eternity. It might be a subject of curious investigation to fol-

spondit. Quod quidem minime sum admiratus eum philosophum rhetori non esse cognitum, qui ab ipsis philosophis, præter admodum paucos, ignoraretur. *Topica*, cap. 1.

[f] Dicit ergo Varro adhuc de naturali theologia præloquens, Deum se arbitrari esse Animam Mundi quam Græci vocant κόσμον et hunc ipsum mundum esse Deum. *Augustin. Civ. Dei*, lib. vii. cap. 6.

A very interesting account of the theology of Varro is given in Dr. Ireland's learned treatise on Paganism and Christianity compared, chap. 5.

[g] Plotinus's notion in lib. ix. Ennead. 6. so far as an ordinary mind may be permitted to approach such sublime abstractions, appears to be, that the first original principle is Nothing, yet the cause of all things; having neither quantity nor quality; neither soul nor reason; is neither in motion nor in tranquillity; is neither unity nor number; neither in space nor in time; without thought or will; yet the act of thinking, and the cause of all thought; the smallest, yet the largest; the good, the perfect.

Εὖ νὴ τὸν Ἑρμῆν· ὅτι λέγεις δ' οὐ μανθάνω.

low up the question through the philosophical sects of more modern times, to examine how far the system of Spinoza accords with the doctrine taught in some of the ancient schools, and to pursue the inquiry even to our own day, through the most recent philosophical systems, and ascertain to what extent the charge of pantheism is justly to be imputed to them [h]. But a superficial view of such subjects seldom fails to produce or strengthen erroneous opinions, and an accurate research would require the labours of a life.

It appears then, that, of the different schools of antiquity, some held the soul of the world to be the chief God, some a secondary Deity; of the former, some believed the universal Soul to pass through matter unmixed, some to be united and form only one nature with it; and of these again, some considered the corporeal Deity to be a kind of divine reason without personality, others a species of vegetative life, called the plastic force of nature. Is it too much to infer, from an examination of such unintelligible theories [i], that the inventors and supporters had no clear conceptions of their own meaning, and that principles like these

[h] Die neueste philosophie nähert sich dem system des Spinoza von mehreren Seiten an. *Tennemann*, art. *Spinoza*.

[i] Exposui fere non philosophorum judicia sed delirantium somnia. *Cicero de Natura Deorum* lib. i. cap. 16.

had very little influence on the practical belief of mankind? And degrading as the picture is which such systems exhibit of the weakness of human reason, it is at least a subject of satisfaction to perceive, that the two great master minds of antiquity, Aristotle and Plato, never cherished those low and debasing views of the Divinity which inferior teachers ventured to inculcate. With that humility which never fails to accompany talent of the highest order, they both express themselves unable to penetrate the darkness and difficulty which involves such questions as those respecting the divine essence and the nature of the soul; and Plato more than once recommends prayer to the Deity, that the understanding may be strengthened and enlightened[k].

G.

This must be the feeling of every man conversant with metaphysical systems. If we trace the history of philosophical speculation from its commencement to the present hour[l], we shall

[k] Plato, Timæus, p. 22. Aristot. de Anima, lib. i.

[l] Φιλοσοφία γάρ τοί ἐστιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, χαρίεν, ἄν τις αὐτοῦ μετρίως ἅψηται ἐν τῇ ἡλικίᾳ· ἐὰν δὲ περαιτέρω τοῦ δέοντος ἐνδιατρίψῃ, διαφθορὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. Gorgias, Bekker, pars ii. vol. i. p. 83. These words, originally used by Plato with a different object in view, will apply to the present question.

observe the same forms of atheism and pantheism reviving in different ages, and supported and combated by nearly the same arguments. It would seem as if speculation on its wildest wing was still condemned to soar within prescribed limits, and to pursue the same circling flight. The most subtle and profound thinkers have arrived at little certainty upon subjects of abstract reasoning. Nor are the wild and dangerous theories that have sometimes been adopted, to be attributed to pure malice and malignity, at enmity with the good of mankind, but to a restless desire of knowledge upon questions in which knowledge in our present state can never be attained, and to a spirit of intellectual ambition which allows of no limitation to the exercise of human thought. Hence it is that ancients and moderns, deists, atheists, and Christians, men of immoral and moral life, of pious and impious feelings, have built up philosophical systems equally unintelligible. And some of these have been established upon principles of which it would be very difficult to shew the fallacy, yet upon which no man, not even the inventor of the system, would or could act for a single moment. In seeking to become more, we pay the penalty of our folly, and become less than man. Hume declared that he was afraid to think, on account of the conclusions to which he might

come, and the barriers of separation he might create between himself and the rest of mankind. This feeling should have taught him that the pursuit of truth, properly conducted, could never lead to such a separation, and that there was other and stronger evidence than abstract reasoning alone[m]. Reid was unable to refute Berkeley's principles, till he appealed to the common belief and conduct of mankind. And as a rule for our own decision in judging of the conviction of a writer, when his philosophy is opposed to his common feelings and language[n], it will be much safer to depend upon the latter, than upon inferences from his metaphysical creed[o]. Anaxagoras is said to have maintained that snow was black, in order to preserve his consistency as a

[m] Qui nondum ea, quæ multis post annis tractari cœpissent, physica didicissent, tantum sibi persuaserant quantum *natura admonente* cognoverant. Hæc ita sentimus *natura duce*, nulla ratione nullaque doctrina. *Cic. Tusc. Quæst.* lib. i. cap. 13.

Πᾶν γὰρ ὅπερ ἴσμεν κρειττὸν ἢ κατ' ἀποδείξιν τοῦτο κατὰ κοινὴν ἔννοιαν ἴσμεν. Origen de Anima, p. 618. ed. Paris. 1618.

La Nature confond les Pyrrhoniens, et la raison confond les dogmatistes. *Pensées de Pascal,* art. I.

[n] I do not wish by this statement to set up feeling in religion above reason, but above metaphysical and abstract reasoning. In an argument of reason our natural feelings and desires, together with conscience, should form a part of it.

[o] Anaxagoras nivem nigram dixit esse; ferres me si ego idem dicerem? *Cicero Academ. Quæst.* lib. iv. cap. 23.

reasoner; but who will imagine that he was sincere?

The following brief sketch of the moral systems supported by Aristotle and Plato may be of service in determining the question whether the ancients generally believed that truth and utility did not coincide. Notwithstanding the subtlety of their speculative discussions, in which the distinctions and divisions are often merely verbal, it was evidently the object of both philosophers to elevate, and as far as possible perfect, the mind and faculties of man. They both maintained that the happiness which nature had taught the desires of the soul to aim at, as its ultimate end and object, would consist in the perception of truth. Plato considered this truth to be altogether intellectual and speculative. Hence it is that he enjoins the purest moral precepts; the entire subjugation, or rather annihilation of the passions [p], not because moral virtue was a direct means to happiness, but because the purification of the soul was necessary to the perception of intellectual truth, in which alone human felicity would be found. For the same reason he commands the extinction of imagination also [q]; it is a faculty which cheats and deludes us with the image of

[p] Vid. Phædo, passim.

[q] Republic, book iii. x.

truth instead of the reality. Poetry and painting and all the fine arts are to be banished, as obscuring and impeding the exercise of reason in aspiring after its substantial good. But though our nature while on earth, by thus endeavouring to destroy passion and imagination, might make gradual progress towards the enjoyment of happiness and the perception of truth, their full perfection could never be attained till the soul was emancipated from the body, when the shadow of knowledge would be changed into the substance, and we should see essential truth as it really is, uniform, unchangeable, and eternal.

Aristotle, on the contrary, does not consider intellectual truth alone as the only knowledge to which the human faculties are to be trained and directed. Regarding man as a being possessed of passion, imagination, and reason, he provides for the due exercise and perfection of them all. Truth with him is not one and indivisible, but distinguished into *truth* in morals, *truth* in the fine arts, and *truth* in questions of science and wisdom, purely abstract and speculative. These different kinds of knowledge are not inseparably united and confounded[r]. He who possesses that moral perfection which teaches him to think, feel, and act on all occasions as becomes a virtuous

[r] Aristot. Ethics, lib. iii. iv. v. vi.

man, a good citizen, or a friend in the ordinary intercourse of society; he who habitually sees with the intuitive eye of taste the *beautiful* and the *true* in architecture, sculpture, and painting, may yet want that intellectual excellence employed in perceiving abstract truth. Refined and masterly as this theory unquestionably is, and more just and better adapted than Plato's to the wants and capacities of man, it is still inferior to that of the rival system in one striking and important feature. Aristotle (whatever were his sentiments respecting a future state) seems to propose the truth, which he teaches us to pursue, as belonging in its perfection to our present condition, as if the powers of the soul could here be fully developed; whereas Plato uniformly represents it as a foretaste of knowledge, whose fulness was yet to come; a system to be commenced on earth, but to be perfected in heaven[s].

While speaking on the doctrines of these philosophers, it may perhaps be allowable to make an observation on a difficult passage in another part of Aristotle's works, not entirely unconnected with the subject, the meaning of which is still disputed among critics. I allude to the definition

[s] Or rather in some better part of the earth, (γῇ.) This present habitation of ours, according to Plato, being only one out of many divisions of it. Vid. Phædo, ad fin.

of tragedy in the Poetics, in which he insists upon its moral tendency. Plato had banished poets from the republic, because he considered the images which they presented as calculated to strengthen the passions of pity and fear, and thus oppose that perfect κάθαρσις, or purification of the soul, which he believed to constitute the excellence of our nature. Aristotle, it is probable, had this theory in his eye when he declared that the pity and fear excited by the scenic representations, so far from strengthening the passions, would have a tendency to weaken them, and purify the soul from their more powerful and pernicious effects.

Plato teaches that the pleasure resulting from tragedy would be injurious to our moral constitution. Aristotle therefore felt it necessary to declare that this pleasure would have a directly contrary effect, and become an instrument of virtue: and thus he has gone a little out of his way in adding the moral effects of tragedy to a definition already sufficiently complete.

G.

Many authors have done themselves little credit in the attempt to degrade the character of Socrates by bringing together calumnies founded upon the representation of later writers, in whom little confidence is to be placed. Those who have

examined his opinions, as recorded by his own disciples, will understand the bold expressions of an illustrious modern scholar, "Sancte Socrates, "ora pro nobis." The vices attributed to him are disproved by the testimony of Alcibiades in the very treatise, the Convivium of Plato, most frequently cited to establish the contrary opinion: and it should be recollected, that the immoral sentiments contained in this treatise are put into the mouth of Aristophanes, and are censured by Socrates himself as evidences of a debased mind. In other parts of Plato's writings the same vices are reprobated: thus in the first book of the Laws the τὸ παρὰ φύσιν τόλμημα is an expression in which Socrates strongly marks the infamy of the crime. The latter part of the Convivium may be consulted, from which the following sentences are selected: Alcibiades, describing his reverence for his master, observes, Πέπονθα δὲ πρὸς τοῦτον μόνον ἀνθρώπων[t], ὃ οὐκ ἄν τις οἴοιτο ἐν ἐμοὶ ἐνεῖναι, τὸ αἰσχύνεσθαι ὁντινοῦν.

Οἷος γὰρ Ἀχιλλεὺς ἐγένετο, ἀπεικάσειεν ἄν τις καὶ Βρασίδαν καὶ ἄλλους, καὶ οἷος αὖ Περικλῆς, καὶ Νέστορα καὶ Ἀντήνορα[u], εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἕτεροι· οἷος δὲ οὗτοσὶ γέγονε τὴν ἀτοπίαν ἄνθρωπος, καὶ αὐτὸς καὶ οἱ λόγοι αὐτοῦ, οὐδ' ἐγγὺς ἂν εὕροι τις ζητῶν, οὔτε τῶν νῦν οὔτε τῶν παλαιῶν.

Οὐδὲν περιττότερον καταδεδαρθηκὼς ἀνέστην μετὰ Σω-

[t] Convivium, Bekker, p. 454. [u] Bekker, p. 465.

κράτους[x] ἢ εἰ μετὰ πατρὸς καθῆυδον ἢ ἀδελφοῦ πρεσβυτέρου.

Vide also Xenophon's Memorabilia, lib. iv.

"Sunt quidem inter veteres qui ei objecerunt "pulchritudine Alcibiadis inferiorem et juvenum "corruptorem fuisse, qua de causa Aspasia quoque "eum versibus suis traduxit. Sed impudentissi-"mam hanc esse calumniam non solum tota vitæ "Socratis ratio loquitur, sed et Aristophanis silen-"tium probat." *Brucker*, pars ii. lib. ii. cap. 2. p. 539.

The opinion of Wieland, a man extremely well read in the philosophers of antiquity, is of some value on such a subject: "Socrates was a vir-"tuous man in the highest and completest sense "of the word; in every relation of life he was a "model for all men." *Wieland's Aristippus*, p. 75. vol. i.

H.

The figurative representations in the Phædrus will be read with different feelings by different minds; images that are ridiculous and absurd in the eyes of some, will appear to others pregnant with beauty and truth, in the same manner as honey and poison may be extracted from the same flowers. It should be remembered that Plato him-

[x] Bekker, p. 461.

self does not propose his allegories of the soul[y] to be understood in a literal sense, but as serving to convey, through the medium of sensible images and similitudes, some notion of that spiritual essence whose real nature is unintelligible; and he has evidently attempted to explain the imperfections of the soul, in its present union with body, by a narrative of its fortunes in an earlier and uncompounded state. It is not easy to follow him in his lofty speculations, nor to overtake "the "winged chariots of the gods," which he so fancifully describes; but the general impression that remains upon the reader's mind is nearly to the following effect:

[z]The soul at its first creation was perfect, and winged, and sublime in its contemplations; but, unable to preserve so high a flight, it descended to earth, and its wings fell off, and perished through the evil with which it had become connected. The desire of man upon earth should be to recover these lost wings by meditations on the *good*, the *true*, and the *celestial*[a].

[y] Περὶ δὲ τῆς ἰδέας αὐτῆς ἄδε λεκτέον, οἷον μέν ἐστι, πάντῃ πάντως θείας εἶναι καὶ μακρᾶς διηγήσεως, ᾧ δὲ ἔοικεν ἀνθρωπίνης τε καὶ ἐλάττονος. Plato, Phædrus, p. 39. Bekker, pars i. vol. i.

[z] Phædrus, Bekker, pp. 39. 43. pars i. vol. i.

[a] One of the fathers of the church has the same kind of expression, teaching us that it is the business of man, "to give

The soul is like a winged chariot, borne along by two steeds, and guided by a charioteer. The steeds of the celestial intelligences, deities of a higher nature than man, are both good, and directed by the supreme Charioteer, who arranges the order and beauty of all things; the car passes lightly forward in its course. Each intelligence performs its appointed work, enjoys the contemplation of truth, and visits regions of happiness. But the steeds in the winged chariot, destined to become man's soul, are one good, the other bad; they urge it forward (like our desires now[b]) in different directions, the one elevating it to heaven, the other depressing it to earth, and often refuse the guidance of the Charioteer.

I.

The poetic colouring with which Plato adorns his sentiments is frequently considered a proof of his insincerity. No one can deny that his mind was essentially poetical, that in the highest sense of the word he was a poet; for his constant aspiration is after some nobler and purer life than any this earth can supply. The warmth of his genius pervades and elevates every subject which he

"wings to the soul," καὶ ἅρπασαι κόσμου καὶ δοῦναι θεῷ. Vid. Leighton's Works, vol. iv. p. 205.

[b] *like our desires now*] This application is not made by Plato.

touches, and imparts an energy and beauty to his descriptions which no poet ever surpassed. But is the sentiment less true because it is strongly coloured? The ornament may be fiction, but the feeling itself, and the foundation of the feeling, is truth [c]; and the voice of nature speaks more commonly its real belief in metaphor and allusion, than in measured and artificial language. Those elevated descriptions of the future world, the radiant visions which he creates in order to embody his glowing anticipations of happiness to come, prove only the intenseness of the feelings with which he cherished this hope of immortality. Hence his imaginary paradise, with its purple and golden atmosphere of inconceivable brilliancy and clearness, in which all the rocks are of jasper and emerald [d]; and his assertions, that the trees and flowers, which nature pours forth in such profu-

[c] Aristotle observes, in his Rhetoric, lib. iii. 7, that poetical expressions are natural to men under the influence of emotion, ἁρμόττει λέγοντι παθητικῶς. If the truth of this precept had been kept in mind, Shakspeare would not have been so often censured for putting metaphors and images into the mouths of his characters when strongly excited.

[d] Vid. Phædo, pp. 112—120; also Republic, book x. pp. 502—516. The prophet Isaiah predicts the future glory of Jerusalem in images equally bold: *Behold, I will lay thy stones with fair colours, and lay thy foundations with sapphires. And I will make thy windows of agates, and thy gates of carbuncles.* Isaiah liv. 11, 12.

sion for man's gratification on earth, are but faint shadows of those trees and flowers and unfading archetypes of beauty, which yield fruit and fragrance in some better part of the universe. If he declare that in a retreat like this the souls of the virtuous will enjoy in another state of being, not the sensuality of Mahomet's paradise, but that perfect felicity which will result from the perception of substantial truth; is he to be considered at once as a man who disbelieved entirely in personal consciousness after death, and consequently in all recompense of the good? If, again, he describe the dark and tumultuous waves of Cocytus as destined to bear the wicked in their bosom round the vast circle of the universe, rolling on and tossing them unceasingly, and resounding in their ears through all the ages of eternity; is he to be regarded as one who in his heart believed that the retribution of the wicked in every sense of the word was a fable, an ingenious contrivance of the legislator to curb the passions of mankind? His conceptions of paradise were probably derived from traditions respecting the garden of Eden, from which our first parents were excluded, and which, in the oriental imagery of the book of Job[c], appears to be alluded to as the place whose stones are sapphires, and

[c] Job xxviii. 5. 6. Mr. Peters on the book of Job, p. 397. Eusebius Præp. Evangel. lib. xi. c. 36. 37. 38.

whose dust is gold: and his representations of the punishment reserved for the incurably wicked might have arisen from traditions[f] respecting that universal deluge in which the whole guilty race of man once perished.

K.

Aristotle's treatise *de Anima* is extremely perplexed and obscure[g]. It is not so much a metaphysical as a physical work, the discussions concerning mind are principally confined to its operations while in connection with body; and those who expect to find in it any opinions stated positively as to the destination of the human soul in another life will be entirely disappointed[h]. Aware himself of the nature of the subject, the philosopher observes, at the very commencement, that it is of all things most difficult to obtain clear and satisfactory evidence[i].

In defining soul in general to be a habit constituting the essential perfection of a natural body[k],

[f] Mr. Peters, pp. 359. 360. 371. 372.

[g] Οὔτε φυσικὴ ἁπλῶς οὔτε μετὰ τὰ φυσικὰ ἡ περὶ ψυχῆς θεωρία. Simplicii Proœmium de Anima Aristot. p. 1.

[h] Οὐδένα φαίνεται περὶ τῆς τῶν οὐρανίων ψυχῆς ποιουμένος λόγον. Idem, p. 1. Proœmium.

[i] Πάντη δὲ καὶ πάντως ἐστὶ τῶν χαλεπωτάτων λαβεῖν τινα πίστιν περὶ αὐτῆς. De Anima, lib. i. cap. 1.

[k] Ἐντελέχεια πρώτη σώματος φύσικου. Lib. ii. cap. 1. The word ΕΝΤΕΛΕΧΕΙΑ is translated by Cicero, Tusc. Quæst. lib. i. c. 10.

it would appear at first sight that he considered its existence as inseparable from that of the body which it animates. But in the third book, in which the νοῦς, or *intelligence* of the soul is discussed, and which is divided into *active* and *passive*, the power of actively exercising its functions by thinking and reasoning, and the capacity of receiving ideas, Aristotle assigns immortality to this *intelligence*, but denies it memory. It has been disputed whether he meant the whole of *intelligence* to be immortal, or merely the active power. The latter opinion is maintained by Warburton, by Tennemann in his History of Philosophy[1], and has

continuata motio: it is frequently used in the sense of *actus* as opposed to ἐν δυνάμει: the translation I have given will comprehend the other senses: Ἔστι δὲ ἡ μὲν ὕλη δυνάμις, τὸ δὲ ΕΙΔΟΣ ἐντελέχεια: it is what constitutes the form or essence of a thing. Vid. Origen. Celebres Opiniones de Anima, p. 628. ed. 1618. Simplicii Proœmium, p. 2. Towards the end of the first chapter it is observed, that some of the functions of soul may be separated from the body because they are not operations essentially perfecting any parts of the body: Οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἔνιά γε οὐθὲν κωλύει διὰ τὸ μηθενὸς εἶναι σώματος ἐντελεχείας: thus, though the sight of the eye cannot be separated from the *bodily* eye, the speculative energy of the soul may be separated from body: περὶ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ καὶ τῆς θεωρητικῆς δυνάμεως οὐδέπω φανερὸν, ἀλλ' ἔοικε ψυχῆς γένος ἕτερον εἶναι καὶ τοῦτο μόνον ἐνδέχεται ΧΩΡΙΖΕΣΘΑΙ καθάπερ τὸ ἀΐδιον τοῦ φθαρτοῦ. Aristot. de Anima, lib. ii. cap. 2.

[1] Tennemann's Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie, art. *Aristotle.* Lancaster's Harmony of the Law and the Gospel, p. 431.

been recently adopted by Mr. Lancaster. It appears that the question, after all, depends upon the signification we attach to the term *passive* intelligence. If Aristotle meant the power which the mind has of receiving ideas through φαντασία, which depends upon bodily sensation, it is obvious that this sensation and φαντασία being destroyed at death, there can be no longer any capacity of receiving ideas through the medium of the same instruments: but, if we understand by the phrase the power of receiving ideas without reference to the mode in which they are conveyed, there is no reason why the *passive* intelligence should not exist after death [m]. Such an interpretation of the fifth and sixth chapters would appear perfectly consistent with the assertion that νοῦς, or *intelligence*, is immortal, and also with the declaration that the manner of its *apprehending* while in connection with the body is not so. It may ex-

[m] Aristotle does not divide the νοῦς, or *intelligence*, into *active* and *passive* with the precision of his Latin translators, but describes it as operating actively and passively, and he certainly appears to consider these two kinds of operation as implied in our very notion of intelligence. The term παθητικὸς νοῦς, which we meet with in the sixth chapter, is not used in the fifth, where the functions of intelligence are described, and if it be synonymous with φαντασία, is not to be confounded with *passive* intelligence, as will readily be seen by a comparison of the preceding chapter on φαντασία. Aristot. de Anima, lib. iii. cap. 3—6.

ercise its active powers of thinking and reasoning, though more quickly and perfectly after death, in the same manner as now; but it cannot apprehend ideas in the same way, viz. through the medium of *φαντασία*, which depends upon bodily sensation. It does not follow then, because Aristotle denies that the instruments by which the soul energizes while in connection with the body will remain after death, that the soul is to discontinue its energies—that because it is no longer to receive ideas through sensation [n], it is to have no ideas at all. For my own part, I do not understand what is meant by the existence of *active* intelligence after death [o], without supposing that its activity is to continue. Active intelligence, inert and without consciousness, is a contradiction in terms; and so far from Aristotle denying consciousness to the soul when separated from the body, as Tennemann and others represent him to have done, he speaks in the preceding chapter of its ability in

[n] Origen observes that even many notions which the soul has in its present state, its ideas of the Deity for example, are independent of body; *πάντη κεχώρισται σώματος ἡ τοιαύτη ἐνεργεία καὶ* ΑΥΤΗΣ ΔΕ ΤΗΣ ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑΣ. Origen, de Anima, p. 640.

Does not Aristotle mean that it may receive ideas in another way, when, speaking of the intellect, he observes, ΑΠΑΘΕΣ *ἄρα δεῖ εἶναι,* ΔΕΚΤΙΚΟΝ ΔΕ ΤΟΥ ΕΙΔΟΥΣ? De Anima, lib. iii. c. 5.

[o] Οὗτος *ὁ νοῦς χωριστὸς, καὶ ἀμιγὴς, καὶ ἀπαθὴς,* ΤΗΙ ΟΥΣΙΑΙ ΩΝ ΕΝΕΡΓΕΙΑ. Again, Οὐχ *ὁτὲ μὲν νοεῖ ὁτὲ δὲ οὐ νοεῖ.* Aristot. de Anima, lib. iii. cap. 6.

this state to speculate upon itself[p]. It is true, he might mean this consciousness not to be separate and individual, but a part of and absorbed in the consciousness of the one universal Mind; but he has never told us that this was his opinion, (according to Warburton's gratuitous assumption,) nor

[p] Καὶ αὐτὸς δὲ αὐτὸν τότε δυνάται νοεῖν. Aristot. de Anima, lib. iii. cap. 5. Origen. Opiniones de Anima, p. 677. As far as I can understand Aristotle's notion, it appears to be this; the soul of man is like an *unwritten tablet*; γραμματεῖον ᾧ μηδὲν ὑπάρχει, lib. iii. cap. 5. The senses exercised upon external objects communicate impressions to *phantasia* which retains them, and the *intellect* speculates and reasons upon the ideas so obtained. De Anima, lib. iii. c. 3. et 4. At death the senses and the *phantasia* perish, but the *intellect*, having no necessary connection with the two former, survives and is immortal. Origen confirms this view of the subject: ἡ μὲν φαντασία τῶν πέντε αἰσθήσεων δέχεται τοὺς τύπους. Opiniones de Anima, p. 620. Φαντασία γάρ ἐστιν ἡ τῶν φανθέντων στάσις. ἵστησι γὰρ ἐν αὐτῇ τὰ ἔξω φανέντα, p. 619. Again, p. 661. Aristotle (he observes) likens the soul to an *unwritten tablet*, Plato to a *written tablet*. And in other passages he mentions that Aristotle was aware of the rational soul being separable from body and immortal, and of its capacity in this state for receiving the images of intellectual things. Conf. pp. 660. 631. It is surely a most unwarrantable inference to argue, because a metaphysical writer declares that the faculties which receive and retain impressions from sensible and external objects perish at death, that he believed the soul in a separate and disembodied state no longer to possess individual consciousness, and to be incapable of having any power of thought whatever apart from the universal Mind. It would appear from the comparison of the *unwritten tablet* that Locke's theory is not altogether novel.

does such a consequence necessarily follow from any assertion in any part of his works. He denies indeed the continuance of memory after death, which he observes is the result of φανταστία, and, if memory be absent, it may be asked, how can the consciousness of personal identity exist, the loss of which would be fatal to the expectation of future recompense? But with regard to this conclusion I would venture to remark, that, though memory be excluded, it does not necessarily follow that the knowledge which man obtains or preserves by means of memory, while mind and body are united, is to cease when they are separated. Aristotle assigns to the Deity consciousness of happiness, apprehension of ideas, and an interest in the conduct and fortunes of mankind; and yet, by denying him [q] bodily sensation, virtually denies him memory. He has defined memory to be a faint perception of past reality: the perception of this reality may be conveyed in another way, and more vividly, after death [r]. In the Ethics the dead are said to be affected by the fortune of their living friends, yet not affected so far as to have their condition changed by this sympathy, whether they

[q] The Epicurean in Cicero accuses Aristotle of depriving the Deity of thought, because he deprived him of body. De Natura Deorum lib. i. cap. 13.

[r] Aristotle's Ethics, book i. chap. 11.

are happy or otherwise. It is clear from this passage that the dead are supposed to be conscious of personal identity, and to be sensible of pleasure and pain, and that they are divided into classes, some being happy and others not so[s]. But if the happiness of man in this life is not in Aristotle's opinion a capricious gift of the gods, but the reward of virtuous actions[t], it is not easy to imagine any other circumstances or conditions on which the fortunes of the soul after death could be made to depend. And this consideration would lead us back to the necessity of some sort of future retribution which the metaphysical theory we have just examined apparently tended to annihilate. It is surprising, that while almost every other branch of human knowledge has been investigated by Aristotle, how little consideration he has bestowed upon the question of the soul's immortality. It is impossible to speak positively as to his opinions on the subject; for throughout his voluminous works, metaphysical, physical, and moral, we find no sufficient data from which to deduce

[s] This positive opinion can hardly be overthrown by the assertion in the third book, that death is most terrible because it is an end, and there appears to be neither good nor evil beyond. Aristotle's Ethics, book iii. chap. 6. He might speak thus of death, and the fear of death, in the mind of man without intending thereby to deny a future state.

[t] Aristotle's Ethics, book i. chap. 9. book x. chap. 8.

any certain conclusion. It is probable, from the practical character of his mind, that he was unwilling to indulge in speculations on a question from the discussion of which he could arrive at no clear and accurate knowledge. It is not often that we meet with a more complete example of what the logicians call the *petitio principii* than the assertions of Warburton respecting the chapter we have attempted to discuss. Cudworth had declared it to be obscure, but, says the author of the Legation, [u] "had that excellent person re-
"flected on the general doctrine of the TO 'EN he
"would have found the passage plain and easy." And he sums up his observations in that convenient form of words recommended by the ancient sophists and rhetoricians, to silence opposition by alarming the adversary into an idea that his dissent will be interpreted as a proof of ignorance: "The learned well know that the Intellectus
"Agens of Aristotle was the very same with the
"Anima Mundi of Plato and Pythagoras." Now, omitting all further inquiry into the correctness of Warburton's representations respecting Plato's creed, it may be sufficient to observe at present, that if the learned have acquired such satisfactory knowledge of the opinions entertained by the Sta-

[u] Divine Legation, lib. iii. sect. 4. vol. ii. p. 112.

gyrite on the same subject, it must have been from other sources than his own writings.

That Aristotle believed in a [x] *Supreme Being*, the original Mover of all things, enjoying perfect felicity, and the source of all good, may be abundantly proved; that, besides the Supreme Being, he maintained the existence also of [y] *one intelligent Principle* (notwithstanding his notion that all the spheres were animated essences) pervading the universe, may be inferred from some expressions in his metaphysical works, and from a direct assertion in his Politics. In addition to these, he appears to have considered [z] *Nature* as a third and distinct cause, performing its functions subordinate to and dependent on the two former;

[x] Φαμὲν δὲ τὸν θεὸν εἶναι ζῶον ἀΐδιον ἄριστον, ὥστε ζωὴ καὶ αἰὼν συνεχὴς καὶ ἀΐδιος ὑπάρχει τῷ θεῷ. Metaph. lib. xiv. cap. 7.

Ἡ ἀρχὴ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον τῶν ὄντων ἀκίνητον καὶ καθ' αὐτό. Ibid. cap. 8.

Εἰ μὴ ἔσται παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἄλλα, οὐκ ἔσται ἀρχὴ, καὶ τάξις, καὶ γενέσις. Ibid. cap. 10.

Ὁ θεὸς δοκεῖ τὸ αἴτιον πᾶσιν εἶναι καὶ ἀρχή τις. Ibid. lib. i. c. 2.

Πάντα ἔχει τἀγαθὰ ὁ θεὸς καί ἐστιν αὐτάρκης. Magna Moralia, lib. ii. cap. 15.

[y] Σχολῇ γὰρ ἂν ὁ θεὸς ἔχοι καλῶς καὶ ΠΑΣ Ο ΚΟΣΜΟΣ, οἷς οὐκ εἰσὶν ἐξωτερικαὶ πράξεις παρὰ τὰς οἰκείας τὰς αὐτῶν. Aristot. Politic. lib. vii. cap. 3. Vide also Metaph. lib. xiv. cap. 8. de Cœlo, lib. ii. cap. 3. Idem, lib. i. cap. 9.

[z] Ἐκ τοιαύτης ἄρα ἀρχῆς ἤρτηται ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ ΦΥΣΙΣ. Metaph. lib. xiv. cap. 7. Vide also Phys. lib. ii. cap. 1.

but he has by no means clearly or consistently explained the peculiar province of each, nor the relation which they bear to the human soul. Although therefore it may be allowed that he held the doctrine of the Anima Mundi, he does not seem to have taught it in the fulness of Plato's sense, who confounds it with the law of *Nature*, and gives a diffuse account of its creation, attributes, and operations. This view of his opinions is supported by the authority of [a] Eusebius and other fathers of the church, who triumphantly mention the discordance of these great teachers on the subject, as contrasted with the harmony of the inspired writers. It is well known also that the two philosophers were opposed to each other respecting the origin of the world itself: Plato believed that *matter in disorder* [b] was eternal, Aristotle, that *matter arranged*, or the world, was eternal; a doctrine which he probably borrowed

[a] In Eusebius, Præparat. Evangel. lib. xv. cap. 12. where an extract is given from Porphyry containing an account of Plato's Anima Mundi, the following words occur: Πρὸς οὐδὲν τούτων ἡμῖν Ἀριστοτέλης ὁμολογεῖ, οὐ γὰρ εἶναι τὴν φύσιν ψυχὴν καὶ τὰ περὶ γῆν ὑπὸ μιᾶς φύσεως διοικεῖσθαι, &c.

[b] De Cœlo, lib. i. cap. 10. Idem, lib. ii. cap. 1. Cicero, Tusc. Quæst. lib. i. cap. 29. Eusebius, Præparat. Evangel. lib. xv. cap. 6, &c. It should be observed, in consulting Aristotle de Cœlo, that οὐρανὸς is frequently used by him to signify the world: it has the same sense also in Plato's Timæus.

from Ocellus Lucanus [c], who in this instance deserted the principles of his master Pythagoras, and almost all the more ancient writers.

Timæus.

It has been asserted that Plato never confounds the Soul of the universe with the one First Cause and Creator of all things. In illustration of this assertion it may not be uninteresting, however extravagant and little intelligible such a "rhapsody "rather than a philosophy" may be in itself, to give a short abstract of the creation of the world compressed from the Timæus. Having observed that it is difficult to discover the Maker and Father of all things, and when we have discovered him it is impossible to reveal him to all men; having laid down a necessary distinction [d] between what is created and uncreated, and declared that the one is discerned by reason and intelligence, (νόησις,) the other by sensible perception, (αἴσθησις,) the author proceeds to give an account of creation in terms which he premises will be akin to the nature of the subjects treated of, where proba-

[c] Vide an extract from Philo Judæus in Gale's Opusc. Mytholog. p. 501. ed. 1688.

[d] Ἔστιν οὖν δὴ κατ' ἐμὴν δόξαν πρῶτον διαιρετέον τάδε. τί τὸ ὂν ἀεὶ, γένεσιν δὲ οὐκ ἔχον, καὶ τί τὸ γιγνόμενον μὲν ἀεὶ, ὂν δὲ οὐδέποτε; Bekker, pars iii. vol. ii. Timæus, p. 22.

bility not certainty is to be expected. In that flowing and beautiful language which is peculiar to him, as different from the compressed and simple style of the short composition by Timæus the Locrian as the ornamented Corinthian column from its Doric original, he explains in detail how the supreme Deity, influenced by the desire of diffusing his own [e] goodness, out of disorder reduced to [f] order the fluctuating mass of matter, gave intelligence to the soul, united soul with body, till the whole material world arose into existence, an [g] animal endowed with life and intelligence through the providence of God. In the formation of this visible fabric after the model of the invisible archetype which was eternal in the divine Mind, the Creator first took fire and earth, and made the union of these two substances complete by the addition of a third called Analogia[h], or

[e] Ἀγαθὸς ἦν, ἀγαθῷ δὲ οὐδεὶς περὶ οὐδενὸς οὐδέποτε ἐγγίγνεται φθόνος· τούτου δ' ἐκτὸς ὢν πάντα ὅτι μάλιστα γενέσθαι ἐβουλήθη παραπλήσια ἑαυτῷ. Timæus, p. 25.

[f] Εἰς τάξιν αὐτὸ ἤγαγεν ἐκ τῆς ἀταξίας. Timæus, ibid.

[g] Ζῶον ἔμψυχον ἔννουν τε τῇ ἀληθείᾳ διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ γενέσθαι πρόνοιαν. Timæus, p. 26.

[h] This Analogia appears to be the law of nature, like the ἀρχὴ Ἁρμονίας, the law of harmonious arrangement; (Aristot. Polit. lib. i. cap. 3;) or that law so beautifully described by Hooker, *to which all things in heaven and earth do homage:* Δεσμῶν δὲ κάλλιστος ὃς ἂν αὑτὸν καὶ τὰ ξυνδούμενα ὅτι μάλιστα ἓν ποιῇ. Timæus, p. 28. The principles on which Analogia per-

Proportion, which was to regulate the order and limits of their connection. The First Cause next took air and water, gave it in charge to Analogia to combine these with the former elements, and all with itself, till the one vast fabric was bound together in the ties of friendship indissoluble, except at the hands of him who first connected it. The supreme Creator then assigned motion to the whole, and placed a soul in the centre, that its energy might be extended from thence throughout the various parts. Thus did the eternal Deity create the universe as an inferior deity possessed of consciousness and enjoying happiness; a second cause and servant of himself; (εὐδαίμονα θεὸν ἐγεννήσατο.) But this Soul of the

forms its functions, Plato attempts to illustrate by a mystical application of the relations of numbers. Vide Timæus the *Locrian* also Aristot. Metaph. lib. i. cap. 5. It should be remembered, however, that when the ancients appear to speak so extravagantly of the power of *number*, they do not use the word exactly in our sense, but as conveying the idea that all things are subject to certain definite rules and proportions, which may be illustrated by the operation of numbers; as if they had some obscure notions of those physical laws of combination which modern philosophers have demonstrated: Οἱ μὲν γὰρ Πυθαγόρειοι ΜΙΜΗΣΙΝ τὰ ὄντά φασιν εἶναι τῶν ἀριθμῶν. Aristot. Metaph. lib. i. cap. 6. Thus when Aristotle in his Rhetoric observes, Περαίνεται δὲ ἀριθμῷ πάντα, "All things are "limited by number," he means, probably, all things are subject to some *definite law*.

world, though mentioned last in the description, was not contrived the last in order, but was prior both in production and in excellence. It was composed of three essences, the divisible and changeable, the indivisible and unchangeable, and of a third made up of the combination of the other two. From these three substances, the divinity formed one soul, and distributed it to the different members of the universe. But when the composition of the soul had been thus completed according to the intention of the Composer[i], the eternal Cause then contrived all the material mass within, and united it centre to centre[k]. The soul, diffusing itself from hence,

[i] ΕΠΕΙ ΔΕ ΚΑΤΑ ΝΟΥΝ ΤΩΙ ΞΥΝΙΣΤΑΝΤΙ *πᾶσα ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς ξύστασις ἐγεγένητο, μετὰ τοῦτο πᾶν τὸ σωματοειδὲς ἐντὸς αὐτῆς ἐτεκταίνετο.* Thus translated by Cicero: "Animum igitur quum ille "procreator mundi Deus *ex sua mente et divinitate* genuisset." This can hardly be considered a translation of the words. If *ex sua mente* alone will bear the meaning, "according to his "intention," ex sua *mente et divinitate* together, can scarcely signify any thing else than, "out of his own divine essence," which Plato does not say. Ciceronianum Lexicon Græco-Latinum ab Henrico Stephano, edit. 1557. Platonis Loci a Cicerone Interpretati, p. 23.

[k] The principles on which this distribution is made are described with all the useless and unintelligible mysticism in which Plato was so fond of indulging. The laws again by which the composition of the soul was regulated are explained by a fanciful combination of numbers. In this sense, the number of the soul in Timæus the Locrian is declared to be

pervaded the extremity of the heaven revolving upon itself around it, and established the commencement of a life unceasing and full of intellectual enjoyment. Formed by the most excellent Creator the most excellent of created things, it is endowed with a capacity of perceiving eternal truths. From its proportionate distribution and compound essence, and self-revolving power[1], when it approaches any divisible or indivisible substance, it is enabled to discern, by moving itself through its own entire nature, the identity and differences of things, to what class each belongs, the time and place and manner of its existence, the distinction

114695. Vide Timæus the Locrian. Bekker, pars iii. vol. iii. p. 382.

Absurd as these speculations of Plato are, they are more than equalled by those of Darjes, a German writer, (and he was only one of a school,) not a century ago, who published a philosophical treatise to *demonstrate the Trinity by algebraical formulæ.* Tractatus philosophicus in quo Pluralitas Personarum in Deitate, &c. 1735. Problems of the same kind are also to be found in Stapfer, a divine of a different church, in a learned work, (Institutiones Theolog. tomi 5. Tiguri, 1743.) Vid. vol. iii. p. 481, 482, &c. And Dr. Hutchinson, in his inquiry into the origin of our ideas of beauty and virtue, has applied algebra to the question of "moral merit:" "The benevolence (moral merit) of an "agent is proportional to a fraction, having the moment of "good for the numerator, and the ability of the agent for the "denominator." *Life and Writings of Dr. Reid,* in Dugald Stewart's edition of his works.

[1] Cicero de Natura Deorum lib. i. cap. 10.

between essences eternal and the same, and those created and changeable. But when the Father who had made this image of the eternal deities had seen it living and moving, he was well-pleased and rejoiced, and he determined to perfect his work, and to render it still more similar to the original archetype. He then applied himself to the creation of time [m], the sun, moon, and stars, and other divinities, who though *parts* of the one vast animal, are endowed with separate consciousness and personal happiness [n]. When the Father

[m] It is remarkable that Plato makes no distinction of time in the eternal archetype of the world as it existed in the divine mind; Λέγομεν γὰρ δὴ ὡς ἦν ἔστι τε καὶ ἔσται, τῇ δὲ τὸ ἔστι μόνον κατὰ τὸν ἀληθῆ λόγον προσήκει. Timæus, p. 36.

[n] This is certainly Plato's theory, Timæus, p. 29. If then all the animals which are *parts* of the material universe possess separate consciousness, what reason is there for supposing that he believed the soul after death, when it became a *part* of universal mind, would lose its personality. He uniformly represents it as possessed of individuality. *Parts* are used in a figurative sense: Plato himself tells us that the term *body* is applied to the universe, not literally, but figuratively, (Timæus, p. 30.) I am well aware that by subsequent writers the distinctions of the philosopher were not so accurately observed, and that the still greater absurdity of their notions respecting the Anima Mundi might justify the satire of the Epicurean in Cicero, or the keener ridicule of St. Augustine: though we can hardly imagine the creed of any to have extended so far as to embrace the belief, that all things were *literally a part of Jupiter*, and that the Deity in the torrid zone was parched with heat, and in the hyperborean regions was stiff with cold; and that he actually

of all things had created these principal parts of the universe, he afterwards assigned to them, as second causes and subject deities, their subordinate departments in the work of creation. To their care was committed the formation of other animated essences inferior to themselves. They are charged in gratitude for the immortality which their Maker in his benevolence has given them, and to which they had no natural claim, to devote themselves diligently to the task: "[o] Deities of dei-
" ties, of whom I am Creator and Father, ye are
" not immortal and indissoluble; what I have made
" I can dissolve, yet ye shall not be dissolved, nor
" be subject to death, through the might of my
" will. Apply yourselves to the creation of ani-
" mals, imitating my power exerted in your pro-
" duction. I will furnish you with the first prin-
" ciples and eternal seeds for the formation of
" those who are to resemble the immortal Gods,
" but do ye, adding the mortal to the immortal
" nature, mould and produce them into being,

died in men, and was *whipped in boys*: "Quid infelicius credi
" potest quam Jovis partem vapulare cum puer vapulat," *Cicero de Natura Deorum* lib. i. cap. 10, 11. St. Augustin, Civ. Dei, lib. iv. cap. 13. Dr. Ireland, p. 184, 185. Vide also Comment. Marsil. Ficini, lib. iii. cap. 3. Plotini Ennead. 4.

[o] The spirit and beauty of the passage beginning Θεοὶ θεῶν, ὧν ἐγὼ δημιουργὸς πατήρ τε ἔργων will be felt by every reader of Plato. Timæus, p. 43.

"nourish and multiply them, and receive back "their dissolved elements when they perish." Saying this, he turned to the cup in which he had tempered the soul of the universe, and mingled the materials in the same manner as before, but of inferior purity; and having formed souls, he distributed them to different stars, each to its own star, to be reserved for the production of an animal distinguished for piety towards the Gods. When these souls should be introduced into bodies, and become subject to the influence of bodily passions, the Creator ordained that the man who lived his allotted time subduing his appetites should enjoy a life of future happiness, returning to that kindred star in which his spirit had been at first deposited. If he failed to conquer them, he was destined in his second formation to put on the nature of woman [p], and unless corrected then, he was to pass into other animals, till the irrational part should be at length overcome, and his soul should approach to that excellency and purity in which it had at first been formed. The Creator having established these laws, in order that him-

[p] In other works Plato seems to consider women on an equality with men. Vid. Republic, fifth book, in which he recommends the same course of bodily and mental discipline, μουσικὴ and γυμναστικὴ, to both. Aristotle considered women inferior. Aristot. Polit. book i. chap. 13.

self might be guiltless of the evil which should hereafter infect them, interspersed some souls in the moon, others in the sun, and others in the various stars. The inferior deities, having received these first principles of the immortal soul, proceed to the accomplishment of their work, and to form the body of man as well as that mortal soul which is the seat of the passions, and of pleasure and pain: of pleasure, the greatest allurement to evil; of pain, that most strongly deters us from good; of anger and fear, inconsiderate twin-counsellors; of hope, that easily seduces by means of the irrational senses; and of love, that dares every enterprise. Yet, fearing to mingle their work with that of the supreme Deity, they implant this irrational soul in the breast, whereas the immortal soul was placed in the head, in order that from this acropolis, or citadel, it might issue its commands with authority to the inferior faculties and passions.

An apology is perhaps necessary for introducing such a wild and fanciful narrative to the notice of the reader, but it may possibly furnish some illustration of Plato's opinions, as well as of the poetical colouring with which he adorned them, though we may be unable to determine the exact measure of belief which he himself gave to the different parts of such a theory. It is clear how-

ever, from the tenor of the whole account, that he never confounds the soul of the universe with the One First Cause; nor can any inference be deduced, either directly or indirectly, from it, that he believed the human soul after death would so become a part of the *Anima mundi* as to lose personal consciousness. It will be no uninstructive lesson to compare this diffuse and tedious history, in which the acts of the Deity are so elaborately detailed, with the simple and sublime language of inspiration on the same subject. If such an argument were wanting to establish the truth of the Mosaic history, the style itself would furnish strong evidence in its favour. No attempt is made to enchain the reader's attention, or satisfy unprofitable curiosity upon matters too exalted for human comprehension, by copious and high-wrought descriptions. The sacred writer represents not the Creator mingling elements and substances like an earthly workman [q], and determining by calculated arrangements and multiplied combinations the limits and proportions of their union, but as an Almighty Being, whose words and whose works are the same. The single sentence,

[q] The disciple of Epicurus in Cicero makes this objection to Plato's narrative: "Quæ molitio? quæ ferramenta? qui vectes? "quæ machinæ? qui ministri tanti operis fuerant?" *De Natura Deorum* lib. i. cap. 8.

Let there be light, and there was light, serves at once to repress curiosity, and fill the mind with a magnificent image of that infinite Power, *who spake, and it was done; who commanded, and it stood fast.*

The work of Timæus the Locrian[r] in the Doric dialect, which has been before alluded to, and which is supposed to contain the principles of the Pythagoreans, differs in no important particulars from the more diffuse description of Plato. Two original principles are represented as existing from eternity, God or Mind, and Necessity; Θεὸς or νοῦς, and ἀναγκὴ, of which Matter and Form, ὕλη and ἰδέα, are the offspring[s]. And it is asserted in another passage, that before the heaven was produced the Deity and Matter existed, and also the essential archetype or form of things[t]. The Soul of the universe is described as the composition of the Deity with a degree of minuteness and mysticism that Plato himself has not surpassed. But there is nothing in the narrative to lead us to the inference that the writer imagined the First Cause to confound himself with the Soul of the universe, the work of his own creation, or that the soul of

[r] Τίμαιος ὁ Λόκρος τάδε ἔφα is the commencement of the work.

[s] Ἔκγονοι.

[t] Πρὶν ὧν ὠρανὸν γενέσθαι λόγῳ ἤστην ἰδέα τε καὶ ὕλα καὶ ὁ Θεὸς δαμιουργὸς τῶ βελτίονος. Bekker, pars iii. vol. iii. p. 380. The Deity is also called Ἀρχὴ τῶν ἀρίστων. p. 379.

man was absorbed in it after death. The necessity of the irrational part obeying the rational is insisted on, and it is declared, that the perception of truth will conduct the man who observes this law to a life of the greatest happiness [u]. But it is uncertain whether this relates to a future state of happiness or not. The idea of future punishment, and the menaces respecting it, are discarded, and such doctrines are permitted only as providing a check for those who refuse the admonitions of reason [x]. Yet the last words of the treatise leave a doubt upon the mind whether the writer, rejecting as he did the representation of the poets, and the fables of the metempsychosis, had not some belief in an avenging Nemesis to punish the guilty after death; nor are they satisfactorily explained by the distinction that Warburton makes between the physical and moral metempsychosis.

[u] Δι' ἀλαθεστάταν δόξαν ἄγεται ἐπὶ τὸν εὐδαιμονέστατον βίον. Bekker, pars iii. vol. iii. p. 391.

[x] Ὡς γὰρ τὰ σώματα νοσώδεσί ποκα ὑγιάζομες, αἴ κα μὴ εἴκῃ τοῖς ὑγιεινοτάτοις, οὕτω τὰς ψυχὰς ἀπείργομες ψευδέσι λόγοις, εἴ κα μὴ ἄγηται ἀλαθέσι. Timæus ad fin. Vide also the concluding sentence of the treatise. If Plato had left no works of his own behind him, this passage might have been admitted as affording evidence of his opinions; but its authority is of little weight when opposed to the numerous treatises written by himself, in which contrary doctrines are inculcated. Vid. Warburton's Divine Legation, book iii. sect. 3. also sect. 1. vol. ii. p. 2. 54, 55.

In conclusion it may be observed, that Warburton's knowledge of ancient philosophy was more extended, than sound and accurate[y]. He asserts, that Aristotle believed the care of Providence not to extend to individuals; the Ethics alone might have convinced him of his error. He denies that the affection of love, joy, &c. were believed by Plato and Pythagoras to belong to the supreme Deity, but only to inferior divinities[z]; in the Timæus the supreme Deity is represented as *rejoicing* when he had made the world. He observes again, that in taking away human passions from God, they left him nothing but that kind of natural excellence which went not from his *will*, but his *essence* only. The assertion is not limited to the Stoics, but applied universally. Did the author of the Divine Legation ever read the passage in the Timæus before alluded to? "Deities of "deities, ye are not immortal, and yet ye shall not "be dissolved, τῆς ἐμῆς βουλήσεως, κ. τ. λ. through "the power of my *will*." [a] Upon a general re-

[y] Book iii. sect. 4. p. 95, 96. vol. ii. Aristot. Ethics, lib. i. cap. 9. lib. x. cap. 8. Εἰ γάρ τις ἐπιμέλεια τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ὑπὸ Θεῶν γίνεται ὥσπερ δοκεῖ, καὶ εἴη ἂν εὔλογον χαίρειν τε αὐτοὺς τῷ συγγενεστάτῳ. and hence he deduces the inference, that he is the happiest man who is dearest to the gods. Cudworth, lib. i. cap. i. sect. 45.

[z] Book iii. sect. 4. p. 97, 98. vol. ii.

[a] Vide also Alcinous on the doctrines of Plato, cap. x. Cudworth, lib. i. cap. 4. p. 415.

view of the inquiry, we may, I think, venture to determine, that he has by no means proved his assertions against the philosophers of Greece: to quote the words of Mosheim [b], "Non apertis et planis "testimoniis causam suam agit vir præclarus, quod "in tanti momenti accusatione necessarium vide-"tur, sed *conjecturis tantum*, exemplis nonnullis, "denique consectariis ex institutis quibusdam et "dogmatibus philosophorum quibusdam ductis." Though the author of the Divine Legation has attempted to refute this charge, it will appear, upon an accurate examination, not only strictly true, but to fall short of the truth. In what manner, for example, are the opinions of Plato attempted to be ascertained? Not by a comprehensive view of his own writings, but by an appeal to Jamblichus, Albinus, or Celsus. The sentiments of Aristotle are pronounced upon after an investigation equally partial and unsatisfactory. The most important passage in the Ethics that bears upon the subject is omitted, and the observations on the chapters in the treatise de Anima are made up partly of unwarranted assumption, partly of reasoning, alike superficial and unphilosophical. The statements of bishop Warburton, respecting the other philosophers of Greece, are often founded

[b] De Rebus Christ. ante Constantinum Magnum, p. 18. quoted by Warburton, lib. iii. sect. 4. vol. ii. p. 138.

in the same manner upon scattered passages, applied with wonderful dexterity and ingenuity, but not upon any general comparison of their writings. Nor does he shew much critical acumen (and this is surprising in so acute a writer) in distinguishing the relative value of the testimonies which he cites. He appears at times to argue in the spirit of a man who might think Plutarch, or even Porphyry, as good evidence for the doctrine of the Academy as Plato himself; and M. Antoninus or Apuleius sound authorities on the philosophy of Aristotle. In answer to the chancellor of Göttingen, he asserts, that the Greek philosophers are proved by him to have made use of a double doctrine—to have held it lawful to deceive, and to say one thing when they thought another—to have sometimes owned, and sometimes denied a future state of rewards and punishments—to have held that God could not be angry, nor hurt any one—that the soul was part of the substance of God—to have avowed that the consequence of these ideas of God and the soul was no future state of rewards and punishments. But how few of these propositions have been established upon any solid grounds. The author of the Divine Legation has not shewn, nor is it possible to shew, that Plato and Aristotle held the notion of a double sense distinct from the division of doctrines

into exoteric and esoteric: the assertion, that Plato held it lawful to deceive for the public good, is grounded chiefly on a translation of a sentence by Cicero, either wrong in itself, or misunderstood: that they sometimes owned and sometimes denied a future state, is not true of Plato, if it is meant that his expressions of denial, or rather of doubt, bear any proportion to those of belief and acknowledgment; and in the case of other philosophers, occasional doubts upon such a subject would furnish no very decisive evidence against the general character of their belief. That they held God could not be angry, was an opinion of some sects of philosophy, not of all: the supposition that the soul[c] was part of the substance of God does not necessarily affect the argument respecting a future state of retribution; for the Platonists did not imagine that being a part of universal mind excluded the notion of personal consciousness: that they avowed the consequences of these ideas of God and the soul was no future state of rewards and punishments, is not true of the philosophers in general, but chiefly of the Stoics. Nor are the theories of bishop Warburton[d] respecting the be-

[c] Tertullian held that the soul was part of the substance of God.

[d] In Schröckh's Ecclesiastical History there is this brief and just criticism on Warburton's theory: *Sinnreich genug, aber*

lief of the ancient Jews supported by more solid arguments. History, prophecy, and precept, the common hopes and fears of mankind, are all made to bend to the supposed influence of a law, which, while it *included* within the range of its enactments temporal rewards as well as punishments, cannot be proved upon any sound principles to have *excluded* the expectation of future recompense. Our admiration of learning and ingenuity, however perverted and misapplied, will always ensure to the works of Warburton a certain degree of popularity; but opinions like those developed in the Divine Legation of Moses will never extensively prevail, till the love of novelty and ingenuity gets the better alike of sober criticism and common sense.

nur sinnreich! "Ingenious enough, but *only* ingenious!" Schröckh viii. theil. vol. xliii. p. 753.

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
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